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I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration has long been called a creature of contract, a dispute
resolution mechanism that has no form or validity outside the four
corners of the parties' arbitration agreement.1 Some feel, however,
that it may be time to change this narrow interpretation of
arbitration's function and scope, and nowhere is this need for reform
more apparent than in the realm of multi-party international
disputes. Arbitration has taken on an increasingly important role in
international commercial transactions and has become the preferred
dispute resolution mechanism in many types of transnational
contracts. Although there are any number of reasons why this may
be so, many commentators claim that the increase is the result of
parties' desire to control the choice of forum; absent an arbitration
clause, they might not be able to predict where and under which law
any disputes under the contract might be resolved. 2 Other experts

claim that parties choose to arbitrate rather than litigate in order to
avoid

the

potential

bias

of

national

courts.3

However,

most

1.
See W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws
and Practiceof International CommercialArbitration, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 8 (1995);
Hiroshi Motomura, Arbitration and Collateral Estoppel: Using Preclusion to Shape
Procedural Choices, 63 TUL. L. REV. 29, 44-45 (1988); Thomas J. Stipanowich,
Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Searchfor Workable Solutions, 72 IOWA
L. REV. 473, 476 (1987). For an excellent history of international commercial
arbitration, see Craig, supra, at 1-16; Henry T. King, Jr. & James D. Graham,
DISP. RES. J., Jan.-Mar. 1996, at 42.
Origins of Modern InternationalArbitration,
See Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, The Role of Party Autonomy in International
2.
Arbitration, DISP. RES. J., Summer 1997, at 24; Craig, supra note 1, at 2-4;
Christine Lecuyer-Thieffry & Patrick Thieffry, Negotiating Settlement of Disputes
Provisions in InternationalBusiness Contracts: Recent Developments in Arbitration
and Other Processes, 45 BUS. LAW. 577, 581-85 (1990); Camille A. Laturno,
Comment, InternationalArbitration of the Creative: A Look At the World Intellectual
Property Organization's New Arbitration Rules, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 357, 370-71
(1996).
See Bockstiegel, supra note 2, at 28; Craig, supra note 1, at 2-4;
3.
Lecuyer-Thieffry & Thieffry, supra note 2, at 581-85; James M. Michali, Practical
Issues in Modern Arbitration, in II AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION DIVISION FOR
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION: PRACTICAL
APPROACHES AND CONSIDERATIONS 209, 210-12 (1987) (discussing pros and cons of
international arbitration); Laturno, supra note 2, at 370-71. But see William W.
Park, Illusion and Reality in InternationalForum Selection, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 135,
167 (1995) [hereinafter Park, Illusion] (noting that simple disputes may be referred
to national courts without undue effect).
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practitioners

and scholars

attribute international

arbitration's

growing popularity to the ease with which international arbitral
awards may be enforced. 4 Most international awards are enforced
via the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, known as the New York Convention,5 but awards
may also be enforced under other conventions or bilateral treaties as
well as under national law. 6 In fact, enforcement of arbitral awards
is far more certain and well-regulated than enforcement of judgments
7
from domestic courts, which may be a difficult and risky business.
As international transactions become more complex, certain
procedural problems are becoming more common. One of the most
troubling issues in this area of law concerns joinder or intervention of
third parties into an existing arbitration. Many courts have heldand commentators have argued-that third parties have no right to
intervene or join in an arbitration absent the consent of the existing

parties.8

However,

the

frequency

with

which

multi-party

4.
See Craig, supra note 1, at 3, 10-11; Samuel A. Haubold, Opting Out of
the U.S. Legal System-The Casefor InternationalArbitration, 10 INT'L L. PRAcTIcuM
43, 43-44 (1997); Lecuyer-Thieffiry & Thieffry, supranote 2, at 585-88.
5.
See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New
York Convention], reprinted in ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE
OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION app. 15 (2nd ed. 1991). One hundred
thirteen states have currently ratified, acceded, or succeeded to the New York
Convention. See 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Doc. 1.6.1 (Eric E.
Bergsten ed., 1998) (listing the state parties to the New York Convention).
6.
See, e.g., European Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration, Apr. 21, 1964, 484 U.N.T.S. 364; Inter-American Convention on
International Commercial Arbitration of 1975 (Panama Convention), Pub. L. No.

101-369, 104 Stat. 448 (1990); Convention on the Settlement of Investment

Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), Mar.
18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159; Bockstiegel, supra note 2, at 26;
William K. Slate II, InternationalArbitrations: Do Institutions Make A Difference?,
31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 41, 45-46 (1996). In fact, the New York Convention
merely sets the most stringent conditions that states can impose regarding the
enforcement and recognition of arbitral awards; states may always provide for
more liberal methods of enforcement.
See 2 W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS: INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
ARBITRATION addendum 1 to app. V at 13 (1994) (including a summary and extract
of the Norsolor S.A. (France) v. Pabalk Ticaret Ltd. Sirketi (Turkey) case in the
French domestic courts); see also id. at 71 (including a summary and extract of
Denysiana S.A. v. Jassica S.A., wherein the Swiss Federal Tribunal held that
where there is more than one international arbitration enforcement mechanism,
parties are entitled to rely on whichever treaty is most favorable to them).
7.
See Haubold, supra note 4, at 43; Lecuyer-Thieffry & Thieffry, supra
note 2, at 585-88. However, some would argue that the facility with which
arbitral awards are enforced owes less to the existence of international treaties
and more to the consensual nature of the proceedings. See Craig, supra note 1,
at 7-8.
8.
See, e.g., 1 GEORGES R. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS 310
(1988); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, at 184; Charles S. Baldwin, IV,
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transactions are beginning to occur suggests the growing need to
consider whether third parties should be granted some ability to
intervene or be joined in an arbitral proceeding. The need seems
highest in complex international transactions, where not every
9
interested party is a signatory of the same arbitration provision. The
question raised by this Article is whether the intervention or joinder

Protecting Confidential and Proprietary Commercial Information in International
Arbitration, 31 TEx. INT'L L.J. 451, 467 (1996); John Milligan-Whyte & Mary
Cannon Veed, Bermudian, English and American ReinsuranceArbitrationLaw and
Practice and Alternative Dispute Resolution Methods, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 120, 139
(1989); Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in
InternationalArbitrationProcedure,30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 89, 91 (1995); Stipanowich,
supranote 1, at 506.
For example, international construction projects often involve "webs of
9.
independent contractual relationships between parties of different nationalities."
Matthew D. Schwartz, Note, Multiparty Disputes and Consolidated Arbitrations: An
Oxymoron or the Solution to a ContinuingDilemmaP,22 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. 341,344
(1990). Multi-party disputes also arise in maritime, insurance/reinsurance, and
franchise cases. See Michael F. Hoellering, ConsolidatedArbitration: Widl it Result in
IncreasedEfficiency or an Affront to PartyAutonomy?, DisP. RES. J., Jan. 1997, at 41;
Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 481-82 (noting various ways in which multi-party
disputes may arise). Indeed, the routine use of arbitration provisions in international
agreements has created a situation where the most complex issues of law and fact are
determined by arbitration, not litigation. See Craig,supranote 1, at 8; see also Rau &
Sherman, supranote 8, at 108 n.104 (discussing incidence of multi-party arbitration);
Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 476 (noting that classic arbitration "involves one or more
disputes between two signatories to a written agreement').
The types of cases in which a need for joinder of or intervention by a third
party in an ongoing arbitration might arise are numerous, and include, inter alia:
(1) vertical construction contracts (i.e., owner-contractor-third party
subcontractor);
(2) horizontal construction contracts (i.e., contractor-engineer-third
party architect);
(3) indemnification contracts (i.e., injured party-liable party-third
party indemnifactor);
(4) reinsurance contracts (i.e., injured party-insurer-third party
reinsurer);
(5) intellectual property contracts (i.e., patent holder-manufacturerthird party distributor);
(6) copyright distribution contracts (i.e., copyright holder-distributor
in country A-third party exclusive distributor in country B which has
experienced parallel imports from country A);
(7) employment contracts (i.e., employee-employer-third party
subcontractor);
(8) securities contracts (i.e., seller-buyer-third party financier);
(9) franchise contracts (i.e., franchise owner-franchise holder in
country A-third party franchise holder in country B); and
(10) tort cases referred to arbitration by consent or contract (i.e.,
injured party-product distributor-third party manufacturer).
Notably, in the modem global market, each of these parties may be from different
states.
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of third parties' ° as of right in an arbitral proceeding is wise,
necessary, and legally possible under current laws. 11
Before beginning any analysis, it is important to define terms.
For the purpose of this Article, a third party is said to have a claim to
intervene in an arbitration as of right when (1) it asserts an interest
relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the
arbitration, (2) it is so situated that the disposition of the arbitration
may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the third party's ability
to protect that interest, and (3) the third party's interest will not be
12
adequately represented by the original parties to the arbitration.
The mere existence of common questions of law or fact does not
constitute a sufficient reason to intervene.13
Similarly, for the purpose of this Article, an existing party is said
to have a claim to join a third party into an arbitration as of right
when (1) in the third party's absence, complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties to the arbitration or (2) the
third party asserts an interest relating to the subject of the
arbitration and is so situated that the disposition of the arbitration in
the third party's absence may (a) as a practical matter impair or
impede the third party's ability to protect that interest or (b) leave any
of the persons already parties to the arbitration subject to a
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. 14 As in
U.S. federal practice, "joinder" refers to the technique used by an
existing party to bring a third party into an arbitration, while

10.
This Article will focus solely on the right of willing third parties to
intervene or be joined in an arbitration. The problems associated with joining an
unwilling third party into an arbitration will not be discussed at length. See infra

note 87 and accompanying text.
See Coleen C. Higgins, Interim Measures in Transnational Maritime
11.
Arbitration, 65 TUL. L. REv. 1519, 1534 (1991) (noting that "one may wonder
whether the next step, consistent with a pro-arbitration policy, could be ordering

that disputes of third parties neither bound contractually by any arbitration nor
linked to any agency to the dispute be consolidated); Rau & Sherman, supranote
8, at 108-10 (discussing scenarios in which intervention might be wise and/or
necessary); Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 476 (noting that "in opting for

arbitration of disputes, parties to a complex commercial transaction may be
deemed to have sacrificed procedural advantages critical to expeditious resolution
of a multiparty controversy').
12.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (defining intervention as of right).

13.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).

14.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a). Opponents to joinder of third parties in
arbitration might note that Rule 19 only allows joinder of persons "whose joinder
will not deprive the court of jurisdiction," see id., and might therefore claim that
Rule 19 cannot provide a model for joinder of parties in arbitration, since to do so

would deprive the arbitral tribunal ofjurisdiction. However, there are numerous
rebuttals to that argument, which will be discussed herein.
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"intervention" refers to the device used by outsiders to make
themselves parties to the arbitration.IS
The structure of this Article is straightforward. Part II discusses
arbitration's contractual roots and the differences between arbitration
and civil litigation. Part II also outlines some of the measures that
have been used up until this time to facilitate multi-party arbitration.
Although issues of joinder and intervention are becoming more
important in international arbitration, until now most scholars and
practitioners have focused on the problem of consolidation: whether
arbitrators or courts should consolidate two existing arbitrations into
one. 16 In some ways, the theoretical debate on the propriety of
consolidation illuminates the issue of joinder and intervention as of
right and provides a helpful backdrop to the current discussion. For
example, many commentators support consolidating arbitrations in
order to increase efficiency, save costs, and avoid inconsistent
awards. 17 Because many of these rationales can also be used to justify
intervention and joinder as of right, a brief discussion of consolidation
and its pros and cons is useful. In addition, recent reforms in the area
of consolidation s may suggest ways in which the law on joinder and
intervention might change.
However, before one can suggest ways in which the law might
change, one must understand the current condition of the law. Part III of
this Article outlines the relevant provisions of a variety of national laws
on arbitration as well as the rules promulgated by several arbitral

institutions and United Nations bodies. This survey is not meant to be
comprehensive, but will discuss a number
some more common) from popular arbitral
as well as some of the more innovative
states. It should be noted that this study

15.

of provisions (some unusual,
institutions and forum states
administrative agencies and
is intended to be primarily a

See GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN,

UNDERSTANDING CIVIL

PROCEDURE 261 (2nd ed. 1994).

16.
See, e.g., Hoellering, supranote 9, passim; Rau & Sherman, supra note
8, at 108-10; Stipanowich, supra note 1, passim.
By consolidation is meant the act or process of uniting several pending
arbitrations into one hearing before the same panel of arbitrators.
Although the parties may not necessarily be the same, we do find the

same or similar subject matter, common questions of law and fact, and
substantially similar issues and defenses.
Schwartz, supranote 9, at 341 n.2 (citation omitted).
See Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 474-75, 493. But see Rau &
17.
Sherman, supra note 8, at 94 (noting some "parties and lawyers ... sometimes
find that arbitration is neither cheaper nor speedier than litigation"); G. Hans
Sperling, Comment, New London Arbitration Rules: ParadiseRegained?, 21 TUL.
MAR. L.J. 557, 559 (1997) (noting the cost and duration of average international
arbitration).

See Rau & Sherman, supranote 8, at 108 (noting that "consolidation of
18.
related proceedings is now 'a fashion whose time has come") (citation omitted).
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statutory analysis since the goal is to see if existing laws will support
arguments in favor of intervention and joinder. However, case law will be
introduced to the extent it is relevant and available.' 9
Although radical legal change is often most effectively instituted
through the adoption of explicit rules and laws, reform is far more
likely to occur gradually, based on new interpretations of existing
texts.
Therefore, Part IV suggests the various ways in which
intervention and joinder as of right might be effected using existing
legal precepts and language.
This section also discusses the
theoretical legitimacy of each suggested method and the likelihood
that courts and arbitral tribunals will use each of these measures.

II. ARBITRATION: A CONTRACTUAL CONSTRUCT
A. Arbitration'sContractualRoots
To many scholars and practitioners, the question of third party
intervention and joinder is quite easy to answer. Relying on an
interpretation of arbitration as a contractual construct, these people

argue that if the parties to the arbitration do not agree to joinder or
intervention, neither the courts nor the arbitral tribunal can order
such measures. As the argument goes, to allow joinder or interest in
would be akin to rewriting the contract and upsetting the dispute
resolution mechanism bargained for by the parties.2 0 In addition,
strict contractualists argue that because arbitral authority is limited
to the terms of the contract, an arbitrator would have no power to
hear the joined dispute unless the party to be joined either expressly
2
or impliedly agreed to arbitrate.
As shall be seen, however, such analyses merely beg the
question. Although arbitration is an old and respected institution, it,
like many other areas of the law, is constantly changing to adapt to

19.
Admittedly, the weight of case law in consolidation cases suggests that
most courts and arbitral tribunals would oppose joinder or intervention by third

parties over the objection of one or more existing parties to the arbitration in all
but the most extreme cases. See, e.g., Lecuyer-Thieffry & Thieffry, supra note 2,

at 608-09. Rather than accepting the status quo, however, this Article discusses
how change might be implemented in appropriate cases.
20.
See REDFERN & HUNTER, supranote 5, at 186; Gerald Aksen, Multi-Party
Arbitrationsin the United States, in ARBITRATION AND THE LICENSING PROcESS 5-3, 514 (Robert Goldscheider & Michel de Haas eds., 1984); Rau & Sherman, supra
note 8, at 111-18; Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 494.
21.
See Aksen, supra note 20, at 5-14 to 5-15. This problem is easily
overcome by permitting courts whose powers are not limited by the parties'
contracts to order joinder or intervention of third parties.
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the realities of modem commercial practice. 22 Now may be the time
for arbitrators to take advantage of court systems' vast experience
with multi-party disputes and adopt rules of joinder or intervention

23
In fact,
similar to those found in national laws of civil procedure.
arbitration
mandatory
upholding
commonly
now
are
courts
because
agreements-such as those found in employment contracts-it may
be even more necessary to offset the hardships associated with

with a recognized right to join or
mandatory arbitration provisions
24
arbitration.
an
in
intervene

See Stephen R. Bond, Multi-Party Arbitration: The Experience of the ICC
22.
Court of Arbitration, in 2 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 6, app. VI, at 29, 30 [hereinafter
Bond, ICC Experience].
See Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 475-76 (discussing reasons behind
23.
courts' rules regarding, inter alia, intervention and joinder of third parties); see
also Motomura, supra note 1, at 79 (noting that rules on joinder in arbitration
may soon evolve to resemble those found in civil litigation).
See Stuart H. Bompey et al., The Attack on Arbitration and Mediation of
24.
Employment Disputes, 13 LAB. LAw. 21, 53-58 (1997) (discussing how courts in
In upholding
the U.S. have upheld mandatory arbitration agreements).
mandatory arbitration agreements, courts may be creating a class of third parties
who have no effective remedy for their claims if they are not permitted to
intervene in the arbitration.
For example, an employer may require all disputes arising out of employment or
in connection with an employment contract to be arbitrated. If an employee with
such an arbitration agreement claims to have been subjected to sexual or racial
harassment by a subcontractor whose actions were known to and/or condoned by
the employer, the employee would have to submit those claims to arbitration with
the employer. If the subcontractor's contract had no arbitration clause but did
include an indemnification to the employer for any damages arising out of the
subcontractor's actions while working for the employer, the subcontractor could be
left without any reasonable way to defend itself against the harassment claim. The
employee could pursue an award against the employer directly for harassment
under a theory of respondeatsuperior,and if the employer lost, it would be entitled
to indemnification from the subcontractor. Although the subcontractor could be
called as a witness at the arbitration, there is no way to ensure that the
subcontractor's interests (which might be similar but not identical to those of the
employer) would be properly or vigorously represented at the hearing. In this type of
situation, the subcontractor would be left defenseless if it had no right to intervene
in the arbitration. See also Michael Collins, Privacy and Confidentiality in Arbitration
Proceedings,30 TEX. INTL L.J. 121, 127 (1995) (discussing problems associated with
serial dispute resolution proceedings). Requiring the consent of one or both of the
existing parties to the arbitration is no solution, since there will be times when it is
in neither party's interest to have the third party present. See also Rau & Sherman,
supranote 8, at 108-12 (discussing scenarios in which intervention might be vise or
necessary but unavailable in a jurisdiction requiring consent of the existing parties).
Proponents of a pure contract theory of arbitration will argue that the
subcontractor should negotiate for the right to participate in the arbitration, but
the subcontractor would be unable to do so in most circumstances, since a large
number of employment contracts would already be in effect and could not be
unilaterally altered to incorporate a right by the subcontractor to participate in
the employee-employer arbitration. This is, of course, assuming that the
subcontractor even knew of the mandatory arbitration clause in the employment
contracts.
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1. Contractual Language Regarding Arbitration
Because arbitration is a voluntary dispute resolution
mechanism, the arbitrator's authority and jurisdiction is generally
considered to derive solely from the specific contractual language in
the arbitration agreement. 25 Arbitrators who are faced with a request
for a third party to join or intervene in an arbitration will therefore
look first to the arbitration agreement to see what, if anything, the
contracting parties contemplated with respect to third parties. Three

possibilities exist: (1) a contract that expressly allows for joinder or
intervention of third parties; (2) a contract that expressly prohibits
joinder or intervention of third parties; and (3) a contract that is
26
silent or vague regarding joinder or intervention of third parties.

The first situation, although incredibly rare, is obviously the
most simple to resolve: if the parties have agreed to permit strangers
to the contract to intervene in certain or all cases, then the courts
and arbitral tribunals should give effect to that language.2 7 It is the
second and third situations that cause the most problems.
Many would argue that respect for contracts and party
autonomy requires arbitrators to uphold explicit prohibitions on
intervention and joinder such as those contained in the second
category of contracts.2 8 Certainly, it would be difficult to overcome
such language, although some jurisdictions, such as the state of
Massachusetts, have reserved the right to do so in appropriate
circumstances. 2 9 Such language might be also disregarded based on
32
3
°
efficiency arguments," public policy, ' or equitable grounds.
By far the most common situation involves a contract that is silent
on the issue of intervention or joinder of third parties.3 3 Although an

25.
See, e.g., Craig, supra note 1, at 8; Higgins, supra note 11, at 1542;
Motomura, supranote 1, at 38; Stipanowich, supranote 1, at 476-77.
26.
See Rau & Sherman, supra note 8, at 110-18.
27.
See id. at 110-11.
28.
See id. at 111.
29.
See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 2A (West 1988); Rau & Sherman,
supranote 8, at 111.
30.
See Rau & Sherman, supra note 8, at 111-12 (noting that some U.S.
states have adopted this approach, although it may not be available in U.S.
federal courts).

31.

See infra notes 427-37 and accompanying text (describing public

policy rationales that would establish third party joinder and intervention as of
right as a mandatory, unwaivable principle of law).
32.
See infra notes 418-25 and accompanying text. It seems appropriate,
however, that Courts and arbitrators should require the equities in favor of
joinder or intervention to be much higher in cases where the contract prohibits
third-party participation than in cases where the contract is silent on the subject.
33.
See Rau & Sherman, supranote 8, at 112-13; Stipanowich, supranote
1, at 476. One reason why contracts are often silent regarding third party rights
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arbitrator might try to rely on contractual rules of interpretation in order
to decide whether to permit third parties to join or intervene in the

arbitration, those rules provide very little real guidance, as they are often
both vague and conflicting 3 4 The currently preferred default position is
to bar intervention or joinder in situations where the contract does not
35
expressly grant third parties the ability to participate in the arbitration.
However, as shall be discussed in Part IV, there are a number of
jurisprudentially acceptable ways to mitigate this harsh rule.
2. Differences Between Arbitration and Civil Litigation
In many ways, the debate about whether to permit joinder and
intervention of third parties in arbitration arises from two different
ways of looking at arbitration. Those who believe that third parties,
as aliens to the arbitration agreement, have absolutely no right to
intervene or be joined in the proceedings generally view arbitration as
a purely contractual matter separate from civil litigation. Those who
believe that there should be some limited right of joinder or
intervention are more likely to view arbitration as an individualized
dispute resolution mechanism that respects party autonomy, but
that is also influenced by the pragmatic and procedural due process
36
concerns that arise in the context of civil litigation.
However, the analogy between arbitration and civil litigation is
imprecise because arbitration's contractual underpinnings create
several important differences. 3 7 In fact, supporters of third party

is the inability to anticipate ex ante who those third parties might be. See Rau &
Sherman, supranote 8, at 115 n.139.
See Rau & Sherman, supra note 8, at 112-18. For example, one rule
34.

of contractual construction states that parties will be assumed to have decided
against intervention and joinder in the absence of express language permitting
such actions. See id. at 113. Another rule of contractual construction suggests
that parties will be assumed to have agreed to permit intervention and joinder in
the absence of express language prohibiting such actions. See id. at 113-14; see
also Stipanowich, supranote 1, at 498-501 (discussing judicial presumptions in
the absence of contractual language regarding consolidation and joinder,
including the presumption that parties' agreement to arbitrate includes the intent
to pursue the most efficient and economical means of commercial justice, which
would include consolidation and, presumably, joinder and intervention when
appropriate). Therefore, under traditional rules of contract interpretation, there is
no clear resolution when the parties are silent on an issue.
35.
See, e.g., REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, at 186-87; Aksen, supra
note 20, at 5-3, 5-15; Rau & Sherman, supra note 8, at 111-18; Stipanowich,
supra note 1, at 494.
36.
See Motomura, supra note 1, at 77-78, 80-81 (arguing against certain
approaches to arbitration that make arbitration more like civil litigation, but
noting that there is a trend to view arbitration as a substitute for, rather than an
alternative to, litigation).
37.
See Bompey et al., supranote 24, at 27-30 (discussing similarities and
differences between arbitration and civil litigation).
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participation cannot rely solely on comparisons to civil procedure to

win their point because arbitration is often perceived as an
alternative to formal, legalistic approaches to dispute resolution and
is not supposed to replicate court proceedings. 38 A brief discussion
of some of the more interesting nexus points between arbitration and
litigation will not only show why advocates ofjoinder and intervention
cannot rely blindly on analogies to civil procedure, but will also
highlight some of the theoretical problems of joinder and intervention
in arbitration.
a. Restrictions on Party Autonomy
Because arbitration is a consensual dispute resolution
mechanism, courts and commentators constantly emphasize the
priority traditionally given to the autonomy of the parties when
39
creating a procedure by which an arbitration is to be conducted.
However, there are at least two instances in which courts will restrict
the parties' ability to act autonomously. 40 Both restrictions are
based on concems that have traditionally been raised in civil
litigation.
First, courts will limit parties' ability to decide the procedure of
the arbitration when allowing them to do so would violate the
fundamental principles of equal treatment between the parties and
the opportunity to fully present one's case. 41 Therefore, one
argument in favor of joinder or intervention of third parties is that
third party entry into the proceeding should be allowed when joinder

38.

See 1 W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:

(discussing Swiss law);
Collins, supranote 24, at 128 (discussing English law); Craig, supranote 1, at 18; Rau
& Sherman, supranote 8, at 91 n.7; see also James J. Tansey, The PrincigalDifferences
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 271 (1997)

Between Arbitration and Litigation, in COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION FOR THE 1990s 41

(Richard J. Medalie ed., 1991).

However, at least one country, Israel, has given

arbitrators extraordinary powers similar to those given to courts. See Israel Arbitration
Law, 1968, S.H. 118, § 13(a) [hereinafter Israel Arbitration Law], translated and
reprinted in 4 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, IV.Israel.2.a (Kenneth R.
Simmonds ed., 1998). For example, an Israeli arbitrator can compel witnesses to give
testimony or produce documents, see id., as well as grant various types of injunctions
or other interim relief, see id. at Sched. 2, § Q. Still, even Israeli law does not equate
arbitration with litigation. See id. § N ("The arbitrator shall act in such matter as
appears to him most conducive to ajust and speedy determination of the dispute, and
...
shall not be bound by the substantive law, the rules of evidence or the rules of
procedure obtaining in the courts.").
39.
See, e.g., REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, at 186-87; Aksen, supra
note 20, at 5-3, 5-14; Rau & Sherman, supra note 8, at 111-18; Stipanowich,
supranote 1, at 494 (noting that modem arbitration statutes limit courts' roles to
implementation of the parties' contract).
40.
See REDFERN & HUNTER, supranote 5, at 292-94.
41.
See id. at 292-93 (noting that the principle of equality restricts party
autonomy).
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or intervention is necessary to effectuate equality between the parties
or to assist one party in making its case.4 2
Opponents of joinder and intervention would argue that
permitting a third party to enter the arbitration, even in situations
where it is necessary to ensure equality between the parties or to
guarantee each party the opportunity to fully present its case, (1)
affirmatively damages an existing party's bargained-for right to
arbitrate its claim without the presence of a third party and (2)
prejudices one of the existing parties by helping the other party make
its case, thus violating the principle of equality between the parties.
Both of these arguments have problems. The first argument is
either circular, i.e., party autonomy should not be curtailed because
party autonomy should prevail, or requires a court to permit one
party to use its greater contractual strength to force a weaker party
to surrender procedural safeguards in a binding dispute resolution
forum. 4 3

Obviously, courts cannot let this kind of "might makes

right" philosophy prevail. The second argument ignores the fact that
every decision by a court or tribunal favors one party's position over
the others. The claim that allowing third parties into an arbitration
is per se unequal treatment of the parties would make sense only if
arbitrators allowed third parties to participate on an unequal basis
such as, for example, only permitting joinder of third parties when
they helped the respondent's case or setting an arbitrary limit on the
number of third parties that could participate in the proceedings.
Second, courts will curtail the parties' right to autonomy in
arbitration when to do so would violate domestic or international
public policy. 44 Not only does this notion tie into the principle of
equality between the parties and the full opportunity to present one's
case (since both are public policy concerns), it also provides its own
45
argument in favor of permitting joinder and intervention as of right.
For example, intervention or joinder should be permitted if failing to
allow such measures would violate public policies, such as laws
stating that no party's rights or interests may be adjudicated without

42.
See FED. R. CIrv. P. 19(1); infra notes 404-17 and accompanying text.
43.
Some states explicitly prohibit such actions. See, e.g., German Code of
Civil Procedure art. 1025, translatedand reprintedin 3 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION, IV.Germany.2.a. (Kenneth R. Simmonds ed., 1993) ("The arbitration
agreement is not valid if one of the parties has used any superiority it possesses
by virtue of economic or social position in order to constrain the other party to
make this agreement or to accept conditions therein, resulting in the one party
having an advantage over the other in the procedure. .

. .").

But see Bompey et

al., supra note 24, at 55 (discussing U.S. case law dismissing claims that
mandatory arbitration agreements are unconscionable due to differences in
bargaining power).
44.
See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, at 293-94, 443-46 (discussing
domestic and international public policy).
45.
See infra notes 418-25 and accompanying text.
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the party being present.4s Because every state's public policy is
different, the outcome under this analysis can vary from state to
state, despite the similarities of the underlying facts.
b. Naming the Arbitrator
Perhaps the most revered aspect of contractually agreed-upon
arbitration is the ability of the parties to appoint their own
arbitrator. 47 Although a number of contracts state that only a single
arbitrator shall be appointed, many others establish the traditional
three-person panel, with each party appointing one arbitrator and a
48
neutral third being appointed by any one of a variety of methods.
Opponents to third party intervention or joinder often argue that
allowing a third party to participate in the arbitration disrupts the
fundamental principle of equality of the parties as it is applied to
selection of the arbitrators, because the contractually bargained-for
selection procedure is destroyed if the new party is allowed to appoint
its own arbitrator and, conversely, there is a lack of equality among
the parties if the third party is not allowed to appoint its own
49
arbitrator.
However, these arguments appear to be based on the belief that
a party may only expect true justice from an arbitrator it has
appointed. If true, this argument destroys the notion that arbitration

46.
Although arbitrators have no right to directly affect third parties' rights
or interests, they often have significant indirect influence on how well and how
easily a third party can pursue a related claim. See infra note 85.
47.
See Laurie A. Kamaiko, Reinsurance Arbitrations, 557 PLI/LIT 201,
234-35 (1997) (noting that although some see the ability to choose an arbitrator

as "a positive difference that allows technical issues to be decided by experts in

the subject," while others view it as "limiting the likelihood of a truly impartial
decisionmaker," almost all agree on the importance of the selection process); id. at
271 n.52 (noting courts' recognition that "a party's right to choose its own
arbitrator is a valuable one").

48.
See id. at 234, 239-47; see also Rau & Sherman, supra note 8, at 92
(noting neutral arbitrators' influence over party-appointed arbitrators). However,
the ability of a party to choose an arbitrator who can or will vigorously advocate
its position is diminished in institutionally-administered arbitrations, where
arbitrators are bound by ethical standards of behavior that do not distinguish
between party-appointed arbitrators and "neutral" arbitrators. See Slate, supra

note 6, at 58; see also International Bar Association Ethics for International
Arbitrators, reprinted in REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, app. 14 (containing
international arbitrators' code of ethics).
49.
See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, at 186-7, 292-93; LecuyerThieffry & Thieffry, supranote 2, at 609-10; Rau & Sherman, supranote 8, at 110
n. 115 (discussing in the context of the French Dutco case the principle of equality
of the parties and whether every party in an arbitration has a right to name an
arbitrator); Eric A. Schwartz, Multi-Party Arbitration and the ICC: In the Wake of
Dutco, in 2 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 6, app. vi, passim [hereinafter Schwartz,
Dutco]; Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 523 (discussing the "race to arbitration" in
order to have the right to name an arbitrator).
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can provide any sort of objective, non-biased resolution of disputes. 50
If arbitration is to be considered a legally sanctioned and legally
enforceable dispute resolution mechanism, then we must believe that
arbitrators rule on the facts and legal or equitable principles before
them, not on party affiliation. 5 1 If a third party's right to join or
intervene in an arbitration is limited merely because of concerns
about the selection of the arbitral tribunal, then we are abandoning
the notion that arbitration can be objective and embracing the notion
that party affiliation is determinative.
In fact, experience suggests that party affiliation is not as
important as some practitioners and commentators believe it to be.
For example, the way in which arbitrators are selected often
eliminates much of the parties' supposed freedom of choice. Most of
the time, practitioners are forced to choose "their" arbitrator from a
list of names supplied to them by the institution administering the
arbitration.5 2 Many of these potential arbitrators will be personally
unknown to counsel and will only be distinguishable by the short
professional biographies that are found in legal publications or are
attached to the list submitted by the administering agency. In cases
such as these, the most counsel can do is make an educated guess,
based on each candidate's professional background, as to who might
be more inclined toward a particular perspective. 5 3 In any event,
nothing is certain, and the composition of the arbitral tribunal will
often come down to the luck of the draw, just as it does in litigation.
If we believe that arbitrators are required to decide on the basis
of the law and the facts, and if the practical reality of the tribunal
selection process contains little real choice for counsel, then there

50.
See Kamaiko, supra note 47, at 240-43 (comparing the view that all
arbitrators should be neutral with the view that party-appointed arbitrators can
act as advocates for their party's perspective); see also Rau & Sherman, supra
note 8, at 92-93 (noting the influence a neutral third arbitrator can have on partyappointed arbitrators).
51.
See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, at 221 (noting that "[m]ost nonneutral arbitrators will not allow the fact of their appointment by one party to
dictate the outcome of the proceedings"); id. at 222 (noting that American
Arbitration Association Code of Ethics requires even non-neutral arbitrators to
"act in good faith and with integrity and fairness"). But see 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra
note 38, at 545 (noting that "impartiality has often proved unrealistic with respect
to party-appointed arbitrators"); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, at 372 (noting
that "it is not improper for a party-nominated arbitrator to ensure that the arbitral
tribunal properly understands the case being advanced by that party").
52.

See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, at 210-11 (describing the list

system of choosing arbitrators); Netherlands Arbitration Institute Arbitration
Rules, reprintedin id. at app. 10, art. 14.
53.
See DELAUME, supra note 8, at 315 (noting that in "institutional
arbitration, the parties are not always given the same opportunity to express their
preference as to the choices of arbitrators" and that most attorneys select
international arbitrators on the basis of the arbitrator's language ability,
familiarity with the applicable law, business experience, and nationality).
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appears to be little need to give third parties the right to appoint their
4
own arbitrator if they intervene or are joined in an arbitration.
Although some third parties may want the right to appoint an
arbitrator, they should realize that their choices may come down to
(1) participating in the arbitration without selecting an arbitrator or
(2) not participating at all. Given that scenario, most third parties
will willingly surrender the opportunity to participate in the selection
of the tribunal, barring a situation where a potential arbitrator has a
personal interest in the third party or its claim.5 5 This solution not
only appears logical but respects
the original parties' agreement
56
concerning the selection process.
c. Payment of Arbitrators
Unlike civil litigation, which is administered by the state and
supported by state funds, arbitrators, or the arbitral institution
57
which is administering the arbitration, are paid for their efforts.
Often the cost of the arbitration is split between the parties, although
in some cases the English or "loser pays" rule applies.5 8 The issue
that is raised in cases of joinder or intervention is whether the
original parties to the arbitration should share in the costs associated
with hearing the claims of the third party or whether the third party
should bear those costs alone.
On the one hand, it makes sense to require payment from the
intervening party, who has at least a nominal choice between proceeding
in the arbitral forum and pursuing its remedy in subsequent arbitrations
or litigation.5 9 Alternatively, a contracting party that joins a third party
may be assessed the additional costs. This approach acknowledges the
fact that the existing parties never agreed to take on the costs associated

54.
See Schwartz, Dutco, supranote 49, at 7 & n.20. But see Stipanowich,
supra note 1, at 523.
55.
Similarly, third parties should not be able to object to the constitution
of a sitting tribunal unless one of the arbitrators has an interest in the third
party. In such a case, the arbitrator should step down and whoever appointed
that arbitrator should be allowed to choose again.
56.
Some procedural rules are already attempting to address the problems
of selecting a tribunal in multi-party disputes. For example, the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) grants the right to appoint an arbitrator to the group
of claimants or respondents, not to individual parties. See International Chamber
of Commerce: Rules of Arbitration, art. 10, effective Jan. 1, 1998 [hereinafter New
ICC Rules]. The rules of the World Intellectual Property Organization also include
a multi-party selection procedure. See World Intellectual Property Organization:
Mediation, Arbitration, and Expedited Arbitration Rules, art. 18, 34 I.L.M. 559,
571 [hereinafter WIPO Rules].
57.
See Bompey et al., supranote 24, at 28.
58.
See 1 CRAIG Er AL., supranote 38, at 339.

59.

As discussed above, in some cases this "right" to pursue a later

remedy is nothing more than an empty shell. See supranote 24.
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with the third party's claim and should not be required to suffer what
could potentially be a significant financial burden.
On the other hand, there is some logic to making the party who
requested the right to intervene or to join another party pay only for
its portion of the new costs, with its opponent(s) absorbing the
remainder. This second approach would be justified if the original
parties had a contract stipulating that "all disputes" arising out of a
certain contract, relationship, or transaction were to be submitted to
arbitration. 60
Under this type of arbitration agreement, the
contracting parties could be said to have implicitly consented to take
on the risks and costs associated with third-party arbitration. 6 1 This

latter method might also be appropriate when the party attempting to

intervene or be joined in the arbitration is an individual or small
company unable to pay the large fees associated with complex
62
arbitration.
d. Equitable Principles
Arbitration also differs from civil litigation in that arbitrators are
often less bound by strict legal rules and more influenced by
equitable principles. 63 In fact, one of the reasons why parties choose

60.
See 1 CRAIG ET ALu., supra note 38, at 108-09 (discussing an English court
case recognizing that language referring "all claims ...arising out of or in connection"
with the contract permitted tort claims to be arbitrable); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note
5, at 151-54 (discussing the scope of agreement arising under certain types of
contractual language); Milligan-Whyte & Veed, supra note 8, at 134 (discussing scope
of arbitration agreements); Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 477 (noting the common
arbitral language of "all claims, disputes and other matters arising out of, or relating to'
the contract between the parties"). Arbitration agreements must have some defined
boundaries, however; "[plarties cannot enter into an unlimited agreement that any
controversy that should ever arise between them is subject to arbitration." 1 CRAIG ET
AL., supranote 38, at 108; see also The Final Report on Interim and PartialAwards by a
Working Party to the Commission on InternationalArbitration, in 2 CRAIG ET AL., supra
note 6, app. V, at 5, 8 (discussing the breadth of terms such as "any" or "all" disputes
"arising in connection with" a particular transaction).
61.
See Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 500-01 (discussing judicial
presumptions in the absence of contractual language regarding consolidation and

joinder, including the presumption that parties' agreement to arbitrate includes
the intent to pursue the most efficient and economical means of commercial
justice, which would include consolidation and, presumably, joinder and
intervention when appropriate). Similarly, some courts have held that, where
multiple parties have signed identical arbitration clauses in different contracts,
the parties can be found to have consented to joint administration of a single
arbitration. See Rau & Sherman, supranote 8, 109 n. 112 (discussing the French
Dutco case).
62.
See Bompey et al., supra note 24, at 37 (noting that some people
.cannot afford to hire a private arbitrator"); Sperling, supranote 17, at 559.
63.
See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 271 (discussing Swiss law);
Bompey et al., supra note 24, at 28; Collins, supra note 24, at 128 (discussing
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arbitration over litigation is to avoid excess legalism in the resolution
of their disputes and resolve their differences in a more common
sense manner.6 4
Equitable considerations can be introduced
through the fundamental principles established by an arbitration's
procedural rules or through contractual language granting the
arbitrators the ability to decide "in accordance with principles of
equity," ex aequo et bono, or as amiable compositeurs. Although
such language certainly does not give arbitrators the ability to decide
cases carte blanche, it can give them more discretion to allow third
parties to intervene or join the arbitration in the interest of equity.
As the concepts of amiable compositeurs and ruling ex aequo et
bono are seldom encountered in the United States, a short
explanation is in order. Some people think that an arbitrator who
decides as an amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono can
disregard all legal principles and decide issues on her personal
whim.6 5 This is not true, however, as the scope of both powers is
well-defined.
Amiable composition allows arbitrators to decide cases in
accordance with customary principles of equity and international
commerce. This power permits arbitrators to arrive at an award that
is fair in light of all circumstances, rather than in strict conformity
with legal rules.6 6 However, amiable compositeurs depart from strict
legal principles only when the outcome under the law would be unfair
or inequitable.6 7 Legal principles must be considered first, even by
amiable compositeurs.6 8
In addition, amiable compositeurs
generally may not disregard mandatory provisions of substantive law
or the public policy of the forum state.6 9 If an amiable compositeur

English law); Craig, supra note 1, at 18; Motomura, supra note 1, at 43; Rau &
Sherman, supra note 8, at 91 n.7.
64.
See Bompey et al., supra note 24, at 28; Craig, supra note 1, at 18;
Rau & Sherman, supra note 8, at 91 n.7.
65.
See Milligan-Whyte & Veed, supranote 8, at 13 1.
66.
See Higgins, supra note 11, at 1544; William W. Park, National Law
and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in International
Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REv. 647, 648 n.1 (1989) [hereinafter Park, NationalLaw].
67.
See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, at 36; Lecuyer-Thieffry &
Thieffry, supra note 2, at 592. Some commentators believe that, in practice,

arbitrators empowered to act as amiable compositeurs are more able to adapt a

contract's terms or fill a gap, at least "so long as they [act] with procedural
fairness."

REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, at 183.

This suggests that

arbitrators acting as amiable compositeurs should be allowed to permit joinder or
intervention of third parties when not doing so would result in unfairness and

when the contract is silent on the issue.
658.
See Lecuyer-Thieffry & Thieffry, supranote 2, at 592.
69.
See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, at 35-38; Lecuyer-Thieffry &
Thieffry, supranote 2, at 592; see also 2 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 6, addendum 1
to app. V at 74 (including a summary and extract from PesqueriasEspanolas de
Barcaloa S.A. v.Alsthom Atlantique S.A., in which the Chambre des Recourse of
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does disregard such laws, there is the risk that the award will not
70
only be unenforceable within the forum state but elsewhere as well.
Arbitrators who decide ex aequo et bono have slightly broader
discretion than amiable compositeurs in that they are able to
disregard even mandatory provisions of substantive law in order to
reach an equitable outcome. 7 1 Although some countries, particularly
England, have been hesitant to recognize arbitrators' ability to act as
amiable compositeurs or ex aequo et bono, other countries,
particularly those with a civil law perspective, expressly recognize
72
arbitrators' ability to act in these capacities.
e. Confidentiality
Unlike court proceedings, which are, for the most part, open to
the public, arbitrations are usually private affairs.7 s In fact, many
parties choose to arbitrate their disputes rather than litigate them
precisely because they do not want certain information, such as trade
secrets, revenue, and other sensitive data, to become public. 7 4
Opponents to third party participation in arbitration often argue that
when third parties are allowed to enter an arbitration through joinder
or intervention, courts and arbitrators destroy the confidentiality that
the parties thought so important. 75
However, confidentiality may not be the insurmountable obstacle
some commentators make it out to be. 7 6 The reality is that many

potential third party participants will already have full or partial
knowledge of the affairs at issue, thus eliminating many of the

the Tribunal Cantonal du Canton de Vaud (Switzerland) held that an amiable
compositeur was "bound only by those mandatory rules of procedure which were
set up by the Swiss Concordat on Arbitration").
70.
See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 272.
71.
See Lecuyer-Thieffry & Thieffry, supranote 2, at 592 & n.75.
72.
See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, at 37; Milligan-Whyte & Veed,
supranote 8, at 131.
73.
See Bompey et al., supra note 24, at 28; Collins, supra note 24, at 12122, 134.
74.
See Baldwin, supranote 8, at 453.
75.
See Collins, supra note 24, at 122-23, 134.
76.
Some arbitral institutions have already addressed the issue in favor of
third party participation. For example, the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the
Japan Commercial Arbitration Association expressly state that "[a] person having
a direct beneficial interest in the case under arbitration may attend the hearing."

See Commercial Arbitration Rules of the Japan Commercial Arbitration
Association (as amended and in effect February 1, 1971), reprinted in Charles R.
Ragan, Practical Issues in Modem Arbitration, in II AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
DIVISION FOR PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, supranote 3, at 243, 347-54.
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parties' confidentiality concerns ab initio.7 7 Privacy concerns can
also be addressed by bifurcating proceedings or discovery or by
requiring intervenors and joined third parties to sign confidentiality
78
agreements that carry strict penalties for noncompliance.
There is also a question about whether confidentiality is as
momentous an issue as it is made out to be. Many parties who claim
that they want to keep proceedings secret often engage in public
press wars, leaking confidential documents and pleadings to the
media in order to put pressure on their opponents or destroy their
adversaries' public image.7 9 In the light of such behavior, it is
difficult to see why confidentiality concerns should bar third party
joinder or intervention as of right if proper precautions are taken to
protect the existing parties' legitimate privacy issues.
f. Finality of Arbitral Awards
One of the elements that weighs most heavily in favor of permitting
intervention or joinder of parties into an existing arbitration is the finality
of arbitral awards. 80 Increasing numbers ofjurisdictions are limiting the
ability of parties to vacate or otherwise challenge an arbitral award, a
move which may have dire consequences for third parties.8 1 However, it
is unclear whether or to what extent a third party has grounds to
challenge any award, especially in systems where intervention and
joinder are not permitted as of right, even when an award (1) requires
indemnification from that third party; (2) makes a declaratory judgment
regarding ownership of an item in which the third party has an interest;
(3) identifies causation of an event in which the third party has an
interest; or (4) allocates fault in a transaction or event in which the third
party has an interest.
Usually, courts allow modification or dismissal of an award only
upon evidence of: (1) corrupt, fraudulent, or other misbehavior on the

77.
For example, most parties who have some sort of interest in the
outcome of a commercial arbitration are linked to the parties through contract or
other business contacts.
78.
See Baldwin, supra note 8, at 453, 460-61. Interestingly, there could
be a reciprocity problem for third parties concerned with confidentiality, as at
least one commentator has argued that intervenors may not be entitled to the
same level of confidentiality as the initial parties. See Baldwin, supra note 8, at
467.
79.
See, e.g., Collins, supranote 24, at 132, 134.
80.
See Motomura, supra note 1, at 50 & n. 102, 76-77 (citing section
84(3)(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, which discusses collateral
estoppel effect of arbitral awards); see also Daniel M. Kolkey, Attacking Arbitral
Awards: Rights of Appeal and Review in InternationalArbitrations, 22 INTL LAW.
693 passim (1988) (discussing the finality of international arbitral awards in
several different states); Park, Illusion, supra note 3, at 181-88 (discussing how

judicial review affects the finality of arbitral awards in several different states).
81.
See Bompey et al., supranote 24, at 29-30.
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part of the arbitrator, (2) lack of impartiality on the part of the arbitrator,
(3) an arbitrator's exceeding her power, (4) an arbitrator's manifest
disregard of applicable law or failure to follow agreed-upon procedures;
or (5) an arbitrator's refusal to delay the hearing or to receive evidence
upon demonstrated good cause.8 2 In addition, awards traditionally can
be attacked on grounds of national or international public policy, or for
83
caprice, arbitrariness, or irrationality.
Even if a third party is permitted to challenge an arbitral award
on one of these grounds, its practical ability to do so will be severely
hampered by its lack of access to the arbitral proceedings. Most of
the bases upon which a challenge may be made turn on a
misapplication of arbitral procedures or a misinterpretation of the
law or facts-elements that cannot be attacked without an in-depth
knowledge of what went on before, during, and after the hearing.
Unless the third party is involved in the proceedings, it cannot make
an effective challenge to the award, despite the fact that the arbitral
results may irrevocably affect the third party's interests. Obviously,
this creates a number of due process concerns.
g. Rights of Third Parties
Although third parties have usually been considered not to have
any sort of "right" to intervene in or join an arbitration, some effort
has ostensibly been made to protect their interests in their absence.
According to generally accepted international law and practice,
parties may not grant the arbitrator any power that directly affects a
third party.8 4 The problem is, of course, when arbitrations indirectly
affect third party rights, a situation that is far more common than
that of direct effect, as third parties are often effectively stripped of
their rights when they are prohibited from intervening in ongoing
8 5
arbitrations.
Most decisions concerning an arbitrator's inability to make a ruling
concerning a third party involve procedural niceties such as the

82.
Id. The problem, of course, is that the third and fourth factors provide
grounds for challenge of an award by parties who objected to the joinder or
intervention of third parties but whose objections were overruled.
83.
See id.
84.
See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 416; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra
note 5, at 294. For example, an arbitrator cannot compel an absent third party to
pay a contractual termination fee to one of the parties to an arbitration.
85.
See, e.g., REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, at 397-98 (discussing the
"significant though "indirect" effect of arbitral awards on third parties). An
arbitrator may affect a third party's rights indirectly by, for example, holding that
a party to an arbitration is liable for damages arising out of a certain action,
despite the fact that the paying party has an indemnification agreement with an
absent third party; see also supra note 9 (containing a list of situations which
implicate a third party's rights).
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production of documents or witnesses for use in the arbitration. 86 The
consensus is that arbitrators have no power over third parties in these
situations. However, the value of these decisions as precedent is twofold.
First, these decisions can be read as demonstrating that an arbitrator
may not reach beyond the ambit of the arbitration to join an unwilling
third party.8 7 Second, these decisions can be read as indicating that
arbitrators should take heed of third parties' rights. It therefore follows
that if an arbitral tribunal must take into account a third party's interest
in being free from discovery orders, then it must also take into account a
third party's interest in the outcome of the arbitral proceedings, as a
third party's interest in the outcome of the arbitral proceeding is even
more compelling than its interest in being free of the burden of discovery.
This principle would require arbitrators to allow third parties to
intervene or be joined in arbitration when the third parties have sufficient
interest in the outcome of the arbitration."8
B. Measures Used to FacilitateMulti-PartyArbitration
Although courts and commentators have paid minimal attention to
the problems associated with intervention and joinder, far more
consideration has been given to issues involving consolidation of
arbitrations.8 9 This may be because consolidation is a far less
controversial subject due to the fact that all the parties are contractually
linked through one or more arbitration agreements. Because many of the
arguments for and against consolidation are also used to support or
oppose joinder and intervention, a brief discussion of consolidation is in
order.

See REDFERN & HUNTER, supranote 5, at 294.
87.
This, in fact, makes sense even to those who support third parties' iight to
intervene or be joined in an arbitration. For example, if the third party does not want
to join the arbitration, the other parties can agree not to resolve their dispute through
86.

arbitration but instead to take their disagreement to court, where all necessary parties
can be joined and all related conflicts resolved at one time. Third parties who want to
join an arbitration over the existing parties' objections have no similar opportunity to

unify all claims in a single forum. Conversely, arbitrators, who have the inherent
power to control the arbitral proceedings and require parties to the contract to adhere

to certain procedural requirements such as equality of the parties and other
mandatory rules of law, should be allowed to permit a willing third party to join or
intervene in the arbitration even over the objection of the parties, since the arbitrators
are then merely retaining jurisdiction over the resolution of the dispute pending before
them.
88.
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 19, 24; supra notes 12-14 and accompanying
text.

89.

Consolidation differs from intervention and joinder in that instead of

permitting third parties to join an arbitration, it unites several existing
arbitrations into a single proceeding in front of the same arbitral tribunal. See
Schwartz, supranote 9, at 341 n.2; supranote 16.
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Generally, consolidated arbitrations, like consolidated trials,
share similar subject matter, involve common questions of law and
fact, and determine similar issues and defenses. 90 Unlike cases
involving joinder and intervention, wherein third parties may or may
not have signed an arbitration agreement, all potential parties to a
consolidated proceeding have signed an enforceable arbitration
agreement, though not necessarily with every other party.
If all parties agree to consolidation, there is no legal or philosophical
problem, since an agreement to consolidate is itself a contract and thus
comports with arbitration's fundamental contractual nature. However,
obtaining agreement among the parties is rare-as it is in situations
involving intervention and joinder-because at least one party will
usually perceive itself to be disadvantaged by consolidation. 9 1 Therefore,
most of the controversy arises in connection with compulsory
consolidation, wherein either a court or an arbitral tribunal orders
several arbitral proceedings to be combined over the objection of one or
more parties.
Advocates of compulsory consolidation claim that by going
forward with a single hearing in a single forum, parties avoid
92
duplicative arbitrations, inconsistent results, and increased costs.
These rationales are also used to justify intervention and joinder of
parties as of right. Consolidation can be for all purposes or for only a
few discrete issues, thus decreasing the need for all parties to present
evidence on all issues or attend all hearing dates. However, most
supporters of compulsory consolidation draw the line at allowing
93
parties who are not in contractual privity to join the arbitration.
Opponents to compulsory consolidation focus on the contractual
nature of arbitration and emphasize the impropriety of forcing parties
to submit to a proceeding to which they did not agree. 94 In addition,
those who oppose compulsory consolidation claim that consolidated
proceedings are invariably longer and more complex than non95
consolidated proceedings.
90.

See Schwartz, supranote 9, at 341 n.2; Stipanowich, supranote 1, at

505-06.
91.
See Higgins, supranote 11, at 1533; Rau & Sherman, supra note 8, at
108-10.
92.
See Rau & Sherman, supra note 8, at 109 n. 110; Schwartz, supra note
9, at 343; Stipanowich, supranote 1, at 502 (noting the possibility that it is more
important to consolidate related disputes in arbitration than it is in litigation);
Dean B. Thomson, Arbitration Theory and Practice: A Survey of AAA Construction
Arbitrators, 23 HOFsTRA L. REv. 137, 166 (1994) (discussing the "empty chair
syndrome").
93.
See Schwartz, supranote 9, at 343.
94.
See Rau & Sherman, supranote 8, at 109-11; Schwartz, supranote 9,
at 342-43.
95.
It is unclear whether this argument takes into account the necessity of
at least some parties having to undergo arbitration seriatim in several forums.
See Rau & Sherman, supranote 8, at 109; Schwartz, supranote 9, at 343.

938

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW[VoL 31:915

Consolidation has not been universally accepted by either
national courts or the major arbitral institutions. For example,
neither the American Arbitration Association (AAA), the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), nor the London Court of International
Arbitration (LCIA) permits arbitrators to consolidate arbitrations over
the objection of the parties. 96 The AAA will, however, administer
consolidated proceedings if ordered to do so by a court of competent
97
jurisdiction.
Courts have also been reluctant to consolidate arbitrations
without the parties' consent. Although some U.S. courts have been
known to permit consolidation, others have not. 98 European courts
have generally been disinclined to consolidate arbitrations without
the consent of the parties unless they can identify a theoretically
acceptable alternative to express consent. 9 9 Lack of privity of
contract is typically the obstacle to consolidation, as it is with joinder
and intervention.10 0 However, several courts have managed to avoid
the problems associated with consent and privity of contract by
finding implied consent or a consent to arbitrate within a group of
companies. Two interesting cases that deal with non-signatories are
discussed below.
1. ICC Case 2272
ICC Case 2272 involved a dispute that arose out of an exclusive
manufacturing contract between a patent holder and a manufacturer
that contained an ICC arbitration clause.' 0 ' The manufacturer had
also signed an exclusive distribution contract with a third party; that
contract stipulated that all disputes were to be brought in front of a
2
court in Brussels.10
When the patent holder filed a request for an arbitration under
the contract, the manufacturer claimed that the ICC should decline
jurisdiction based on the manufacturer's having initiated litigation
against both the patent holder and the distributor in Brussels, which
was the only place where all three parties could be heard.10 3 The
manufacturer argued that the interrelatedness of the two contracts
required all claims to be heard together. 104
96.
See Schwartz, supranote 9, at 345-46.
97.
See id. at 346.
98.
See Hoellering, supra note 9, at 44-45; Lecuyer-Thieffry & Thieffry,
supranote 2, at 608-09 n.168.
99.
See Lecuyer-Thieffry & Thieffry, supranote 2, at 609.
100. See id.
101. See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 102-03 (summarizing ICC Case
2272, 1975 award).
102. Id. at 102.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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The ICC disagreed, noting that consolidation in the Brussels court
was not a legal requirement, but a matter of convenience for the
manufacturer.1 0 s Moreover, because the patent holder had a binding
arbitration agreement with the manufacturer, the dispute with the
If the
manufacturer had to be resolved in front of the ICC.106
distributor's
the
and
holder's
patent
the
obtain
not
could
manufacturer
10 7
agreement to proceed in a single forum, it must bear the burden itself.
This case demonstrates how efficiency arguments concerning
dispute resolution are not always enough to overcome the original

parties' agreement to arbitrate. In addition, the case illustrates how
the ICC will not bring a third party into an arbitration without the
agreement both of that party and the original parties.
2. Abu Dhabi Gas Liquification Co. v. EasternBechtel Corp.
Another case that involved a party "in the middle" was heard in
the English courts.' 0 8 In this case, one arbitration was begun by
Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Company Limited against Eastern
Bechtel Corporation and Chiyoda Chemical Engineering and
Construction Company, Limited (Chiyoda), alleging defective
construction of several natural gas storage tanks.' 0 9 A second
of its
arbitration was begun by Chiyoda against one
The issue was whether the two arbitrations
subcontractors." 0
should be consolidated or allowed to proceed separately."'
The English Court of Appeals acknowledged that, on the one
hand, separate proceedings were desirable because evidence in one
case might affect the arbitrator's opinion in the other, thus causing
prejudice to one or more of the parties." 2 On the other hand,
separating the arbitrations created the potential for inconsistent
findings of fact and results." 3 Although the Arbitration Act 1950
prohibited courts from consolidating arbitrations or imposing
conditions on appointed arbitrators, the English Court of Appeals
held that it could appoint the same arbitrator in both proceedings to
avoid the possibility of inconsistent findings of fact." 4 In dicta, the

Idat 103.
Id.
Id.
See Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Bechtel Corp.,
[19821 2 Lloyd's Rep. 425, available in 21 I.L.M. 1057; DELAUME, supra note 8,at
312-13.
109. See Abu Dhabi, 21 I.L.M. at 1054 (introductory note).
110. See id.
111. Id. at 1059.
112. Id. at 1059-60.
113. Id. at 1060.
114. See id. at 1061. Lord Justice Watldns noted in his opinion that "[t]he
ideal solution" would be to consolidate all actions in a single hearing, but
105.
106.
107.
108.
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Court of Appeals suggested that the arbitrator should hold a
conference with the parties early on to identify issues to be decided
separately and then hold separate hearings on those issues.1 15 Only
at that point could the arbitrator begin to hold hearings on the
shared issues of fact.1 1 6 If the arbitrator thought "it right to be
relieved from arbitrating any further," a new arbitrator would be
named to avoid prejudice to the parties regarding the shared issues
of fact.117

III. INTERVENTION AND JOINDER AS OF RIGHT IN NATIONAL LAWS, THE
RULES OF ARBITRAL INSTITUTIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS

A. NationalLaws on Arbitration
Because arbitration is a creature of contract, parties can choose
the applicable procedural law with relative ease. However, these
agreements among the parties do not exist in a legal vacuum, as
every arbitration agreement is set within the backdrop of one or more
national legal systems. 118 These national laws can affect the arbitral
process in a number of ways. For example, even if the arbitral
procedure is not based on a state's arbitration framework, national
law might be implicated as a defense to the arbitration proceeding
itself or during enforcement of the final award. National laws are
important to the current discussion because they provide possible
bases for courts and arbitrators to permit joinder or intervention as
of right, arguably even over the objections of the existing parties to
the arbitration.
The question of which state's law controls or influences the
arbitral procedure is a difficult one. In fact, different states' laws may
apply at different points of the proceedings. 1 19 For example, one
state's laws may be implicated by virtue of the arbitration being held
within that state's boundaries, while a second state may claim an
interest in the arbitral proceedings by virtue of the arbitral award's
being enforced in its territory. At other times, application of a
particular state's law may be a matter of choice, such as when the

concluded that such a solution was impossible in the absence of the parties'

consent. See id. at 1063 (Watkins, L.J.).
115. Seeid.at1061.
116. See id. at 1062.
117. Id.at 1062.
118. See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 439; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra
note 5, at 58-60 (discussing the interaction between arbitration and national legal
systems); Slate, supranote 6, at 60-6 1.
119. See 1 CRAIG ETAL., supra note 38, at 132-33; REDFERN & HUNTER, supra
note 5, at 58-60.
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parties decide to designate one state's law as controlling all questions
of procedure.
For many years, the law of the arbitral seat was considered
paramount in deciding issues of procedure. Recently there has been
a shift in international law and practice, with arbitration becoming
increasingly "delocalized," meaning that parties are permitted to
choose how the arbitration will be conducted and under which
obligatory procedural law, or lex arbiti, regardless of where the
arbitration proceeds. 120 Because issues such as consolidation are
controlled by the lex arbiti,12 1 it is not too much of a stretch to
conclude that questions of intervention and joinder would be decided
by the lex arbitias well.
Although delocalization was intended to increase party
autonomy in the choice of arbitral procedures and decrease judicial
interference with arbitral awards, the procedural law of the forum
state has nevertheless continued to be important 12 2 because states
have refused to accept the idea that they should have no right or
ability to intercede in arbitrations held in their territory. 123 Instead,

120.
See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 271; Park, National Law, supra
note 66, at 650, 684-85. Many states have begun to pass laws that they believe
are favorable to international arbitration in an attempt to induce parties to
conduct arbitrations within the state. See Craig, supra note 1, at 28; Park,
National Law, supra note 66, at 689-90. For a discussion of the differences
between (1) the law giving obligatory force to the proceedings (i.e., the lex arbit);
(2) the arbitration's procedural rules; and (3) the conflict of laws rules used to
identify the substantive laws governing the contract, see Jan Paulsson, Arbitration
Unbound: Award Detachedfrom the Law of Its Country of Origin, 30 INTL & COMP.
L.Q. 358, 360-64 (1981).
121.
See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, at 79 (noting that the ability to
consolidate arbitrations falls under lex arbitt), 187; Vitek Danilowicz, The Choice of
Applicable Law in InternationalArbitration, 9 HASTINGS INT'L & COmP. L. REv. 235,
238-39, 242 (1986) (noting deviations on the question of which procedural law to
apply under lex arbitz); Rau & Sherman, supranote 8, at 112 n. 126.
122.
See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 132-33 (noting how the laws of
several different states may affect the arbitral mechanism); REDFERN & HUNTER,
supranote 5, at 77-80; Craig, supranote 1, at 24, 41; Lecuyer-Thieffry & Thieffry,
supra note 2, at 600-01, 622 (quoting the Secretary General of the ICC Court of
Arbitration regarding the importance of the arbitral forum).
123.
See REDFERN & HUNTER, supranote 5, at 58-60 (discussing the connection
between arbitration and national legal systems); Craig, supra note 1, at 23, 37-38;
Danilowicz, supranote 121, at 243-51; Emmanuel Gaillard, The UNCITRAL Model Law
and Recent Statutes on International Arbitration in Europe and North America, 477
PLI/COM. LAW & PRACT1CE COURSE HANDBOOK 15 (1988), available in 1998 WL 471
PRI/COMM *15, *19-20; see also Craig, supra note 1, at 17 (arguing that delocalization
constitutes "a misguided attempt to free the arbitration from the application of any
national procedural law); Park, National Law, supranote 66, at 652-53 (questioning
the wisdom of a fully delocalized arbitral regime). However, some classicists continue
to argue that parties should be able to choose one state as the locus of the arbitration
but choose another state's law to control the arbitral procedure. See Craig, supranote
1, at 37; Danilowicz, supra note 121, at 251-56.
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many states continue to believe that they have an interest in
arbitrations that are conducted within their boundaries in order "to
ensure that certain minimum standards of justice are met
particularly in procedural matters." 124 To that end, most states still
require parties to comply with certain mandatory procedural
norms.

12 5

Delocalization of arbitration has not necessarily resulted in the
harmonization of domestic laws addressing international arbitration;
indeed, some commentators believe that such laws vary more widely
now than they ever have before. 126 These variations have led to
several states being identified as more desirable forums, either
because of their long-standing experience in international legal
matters or because of their approach to the enforcement and
reviewability of arbitral awards. 12 7 Some of the more popular forums
have traditionally been, and continue to be, England, France,
128
Sweden, and Switzerland.
Because national law has such an impact on arbitration, a short
review of various domestic laws on international arbitration is in

order.

This discussion is not meant to be comprehensive, but is

intended only to highlight the laws of some of the more popular or
more innovative arbitral forums. Because of space limitations, it is
impossible to discuss each law in toto, so the focus will therefore be
on those provisions that explicitly or implicitly affect third parties'
ability to intervene or be joined in an existing arbitration as of right.
This section will concentrate primarily on setting forth the various
provisions as they currently stand; Part IV will integrate the laws into
arguments for and against the availability ofjoinder and intervention.
Although specific language on consolidation, intervention, and
joinder would obviously be most relevant to this Article, few states have
adopted such explicit provisions. However, arguments for and against
joinder and intervention may be based on, inter alia, mandatory

124.
125.

REDFERN & HUNTER, supranote 5, at 59.
See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supranote 38, at 440.

126. See Gaillard, supra note 123, at *18-19. Although some experts
believe that this variance is due to states' competition for arbitration, see id. at
*19, others believe that most parties choose the arbitral site in ignorance of local
procedural rules, see Craig, supranote 1, at 16-17.
127. See generally Craig, supranote 1, at 11-16 (discussing the advantages
and disadvantages of various forums). For a discussion of the reviewability of
arbitral awards in various countries, see Kolkey, supranote 80, at 693. However,
because so many states have signed the New York Convention, enforcement of
arbitrai awards is not as momentous an issue as it once was.
128. See Craig, supra note 1, at 13-14. However, Australia, Hong Kong,
Japan, and Korea have all set up arbitral institutions in an attempt to

accommodate arbitrations arising out of the growing amount of international
business being conducted within their borders.
218-19.

See Michali, supra note 3, at
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principles of arbitral procedure; the role of equity in the proceedings and
determination of the award; the availability of interim relief from courts
and arbitral tribunals; limits on arbitrators' powers; and the public
policies behind arbitration. The following discussion will focus on these
provisions.
1. Australia
Australia has implemented a number of international arbitration
12 9
laws, one on the federal level and several at the territorial level.
The federal legislation, which will be discussed here, adopts the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Model Law, with a few minor variations.' 3 0 One of the few changes
Australia has made to the UNCITRAL Model Law is to expressly state
that an arbitral award conflicts with the public policy of Australia if
"a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with
the making of the award. " 13 1 This phrase could be used to allow
joinder and intervention if, in any particular case, Australia
considered the absence of a certain third party in an arbitration to be
a breach of natural justice.
Although the parties are free to determine the basic procedure to
be followed by the arbitral tribunal, that procedure must treat the
parties equally and give them a full opportunity to present their
case.1 3 2 If the parties cannot agree on a procedure, the tribunal is
permitted to conduct the arbitration as it sees fit,' 3 3 and the
arbitrator or arbitrators may act as amiable compositeurs or rule ex
aequo et bono if the parties have expressly authorized such
34
actions. '
According to the Australia Act, it "is not incompatible with an
arbitration agreement for a party to request" interim relief from a
court before or during the arbitration.' 3 5
However, the arbitral

129.
See, e.g., 2 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, IV. Australia.2.a-i
(Eric E. Bergsten ed., 1995) (containing texts of Australian federal and territorial
arbitration acts). Many of these enactments are based on the UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Arbitration, which is described infra in Part II1.C.1. See
International Arbitration Act, 1974, § 15 (reprinted 1992) [hereinafter Australia
Act], reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, IV. Australia.2.a,
supra; Michael C. Pryles, Australia, 14 TUL. MAR. L.J. 263, 265 (1990).
130.
See Australia Act, supranote 129, § 15(2).
131.
Id. § 19(b). In addition, an award may be set aside if "the subjectmatter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law" of
Australia. See id. at sched. 2, art. 34(2)(b)(i). This, too, is grounds for third party
intervention and joinder if an arbitrator were to consider a dispute incapable of
settlement by virtue of the absence of any particular third party.
132.
See id. at sched. 2, arts. 18-19.
133.
See id. at sched. 2, art. 19(2).
134.
See id. at sched. 2, art. 28(3).

135.

See id. at sched. 2, art. 9.
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tribunal is also empowered to grant whatever interim relief it
considers "necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute,"
unless the parties agree otherwise.' 3 6 If, for some reason, the
arbitral tribunal finds it "impossible" to continue with the
proceedings, it has the authority to issue an order terminating the
7

arbitration.

13

Australia's position on consolidation bears noting, as certain
principles may extend to situations involving joinder and
intervention. Although the parties may agree otherwise, arbitral
tribunals in Australia are expressly permitted to consolidate
arbitrations upon application of a party.1 3 8 This apparently allows
one party to consolidate over the objection of another, because
39
consolidation may be precluded only by agreementof the parties.'
The arbitrator may order consolidation if (1) a common question of
law or fact arises in all proceedings;. (2) the right to relief arises out of
the same transaction or series of transactions; or (3) consolidation is
"desirable." 14 ° The various arbitrations may be consolidated, heard
at the same hearing, heard in a specific sequence, or stayed. 14 1 As
liberal laws on consolidation may be a precursor to recognizing a
right to intervention by or joinder of third parties in international
arbitrations, observers should look to Australia as a potential
innovator in this area of law.
2. Canada
International arbitration appears to have had a late start in
Canada, 142 and, although addressed by the Commercial Arbitration
Act at the federal level, 14 is also regulated by each Canadian

136.
Id. at sched. 1, art. 17.
137.
See id. at sched. 2, art. 32(2)(c).
138.
See id. §§ 22, 24; Collins, supra note 24, at 126 n.29; Pryles, supra
note 129, at 270.
139.
See infra notes 334-38 and accompanying text (discussing LCIA rules
on joinder).
140.
Australia Act, supra note 129, § 24(1).
141.
See id. § 24(2).
142.
See Sidney N. Lederman, Canada Enters the International Arbitration
Scene, in II AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION DIVISION OF PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, supra

note 3, at 487, 488 (noting that international arbitration was virtually unheard of
in Canada as of the mid-1980s).
143.
See Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.C., ch. c-34.6 (1986) (Can.),
reprinted in 3 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, IV.Canada.2.b (Kenneth R.
Simmonds & Paul J. Davidson eds., 1994). The Commercial Arbitration Act
applies only to "matters where at least one of the parties to the arbitration is Her
Majesty in right of Canada, a departmental corporation or a Crown corporation or
in relation to maritime or admiralty matters." Id. art. 5(2); see also Shelly P.
Battram, CanadaAdopts the New York Convention, in II AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

DIVISION OF PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 499, 508. Therefore, the
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province. 144 In fact, most commercial arbitration is controlled by
provincial legislation. 145 The law enacted by the province of British
Columbia (B.C. Act) was among the first to be implemented, and, as it
appears representative, will be reviewed below.146
The fundamental due process requirements under the B.C. Act
are typical, in that arbitral tribunals must ensure that the parties are
treated equally and are given a full opportunity to present their
case. 147 Beyond these requirements, the parties may agree upon the

procedure to be utilized; failing an agreement, the arbitrators have
the right to conduct the proceedings in any manner they consider
appropriate. 148 Parties may agree to grant an arbitrator the ability to
14 9
act as an amiable compositeuror to rule ex aequo et bono.
Although judicial intervention is strictly limited under the B.C.
Act,' 5 0 a party may request interim relief from the court before or
during arbitration without being considered to have acted in an
manner "incompatible with an arbitration agreement."' s ' Arbitral
tribunals are also capable of making interim orders that they
consider "necessary in respect of the subject matter of the dispute,"
unless the parties agree not to give the arbitrators this authority. s2
Generally, a plea that the arbitrators are acting beyond the scope of
their authority must be raised as soon as it appears that they are
doing so.

15 3

Termination by the arbitral tribunal is proper if the continuation
of the arbitration is "impossible."' s 4 This provision may provide an
interesting argument that, in instances where joinder or intervention
as of right would be appropriate, it would be "impossible" to
proceed.15s

vast majority of commercial arbitration will fall outside the Commercial
Arbitration Act.
144. See Battram, supranote 143, at 499, 502, 508.
145.

See, e.g., 3 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 143, at

IV.Canada.2.d-Canada.2.y (reprinting the texts of various provincial arbitration
acts); Battram, supranote 143, at 508-12.
146. See International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.B.C., ch.14 (1986)
(Can.) [hereinafter B.C. Act], reprintedin 3 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,

supranote 143, at Canada.2.e; Battram, supranote 143, at 511. In fact, British
Columbia is one of the jurisdictions that changed its law in order to make itself
more hospitable to international commercial arbitrations. See B.C. Act, supra,at
pmbl.
147. See B.C. Act, supra note 146, § 18.

148.

See id. § 19.

149.
150.
151.

See id. § 28(4).
See id. § S.
Id. § 9.

152.

Id. § 17(1).

153. See id. § 16(3).
154. Id. § 32(2)(c).
155. See infra note 456 and accompanying text. Conversely, however, an
award may be unenforceable if it "contains decisions on matters beyond the scope
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Canadian courts will order consolidation of two or more
arbitrations with the consent of all parties and "on terms the court
considers just and necessary."'5 6 Although the B.C. Act initially
requires the parties' consent to consolidation, parties have very little
control over the form of consolidation once it has taken place, as the
statute gives the Canadian Supreme Court the ability to make any
order necessary to conduct the consolidation, even if the parties
cannot agree on what that order should be.15 7
3. England and Wales
In 1996, England and Wales adopted a new arbitration law that
superseded several earlier enactments.1 5 8 The Arbitration Act 1996
is founded on three basic procedural principles: (1) "the fair
resolution of disputes by an impartial tribunal without unnecessary
delay or expense;" (2) the parties' ability to "be free to agree how their
disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are
necessary in the public interest;" and (3) limited intervention by the
court.' 5 9

The first two of these provisions appear to be especially

helpful as possible bases for joinder or intervention of a third party in
an arbitration on grounds of either due process, equity, or public
policy. 160 The Act also includes a number of mandatory provisions
which may not be waived or amended by the parties and a number of
non-mandatory default rules. 16 1 Arbitral procedure is one of the
areas where party autonomy prevails, possibly even taking

of the submission to arbitration," which might preclude an arbitrator from hearing
disputes concerning third parties. B.C. Act, supranote 146, § 36(1)(iv).
156.
See B.C. Act, supranote 146, § 27(2); Gaillard, supranote 123, at *2223 (noting that the B.C. Act departs from the UNCITRAL Model Law by providing
for consolidation); Hoellering, supra note 9, at 48; Rau & Sherman, supra note 8,
at 111 n.116.
157.
See B.C. Act, supranote 146, § 27(2)(c).
158.
See Arbitration Act, 1996, ch. 23 (Eng.), reprinted in 5 INTERNATIONAL
COMMERcIAL ARBITRATION, IV.UK (England).2.c (Eric E. Bergsten ed., 1997)
[hereinafter Arbitration Act 1996]. The Arbitration Act of 1950 was amended to
incorporate references to the Arbitration Act 1996 while the Arbitration Acts of
1975 and 1979 were repealed. See id. at sched. 3-4. Notably, the Arbitration Act
1996 applies only to arbitrations taking place in England or Wales; Scotland,

which has a separate legal system, has its own laws on arbitration. See 1 CRAIG
ETAL., supra note 38, at 465.
159. Arbitration Act 1996, supranote 158, § 1.
160.
See id. § 81(1)(c) ("[n]othing in this Part shall be construed as excluding
the operation of any rule of law . . . as to . . . the refusal of recognition or
enforcement of an arbitral award on grounds of public policy"); see also Toby T.
Landau, Introductory Note to United Kingdom: Arbitration Act 1996, available in
36 I.L.M. 155, 159 (discussing breadth of the language in section 1 of the
Arbitration Act 1996).
161.
See Arbitration Act 1996, supra note 158, § 4; Landau, supra note 160,
at 158-59.
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precedence over the arbitrator's duty to manage the process
properly.162
In the past, English arbitration law required disputes to be decided
in strict accordance with English law. 163 However, with the passage of
the Arbitration Act 1996, parties may now include "equity clauses" to
allow arbitrators to decide disputes under equitable, rather than strictly
legal, principles. 1 6 4 This departs from the previous approach, which had
been particularly hostile to the concept of amiable compositeurs and
deciding ex aequo et bono. 165 Nevertheless, despite the passage of the
new Act, parties may deem it wise not to hold their arbitration in
they want the arbitrator to have the full use of these
England or Wales if
16 6
equitable powers.
Under the Arbitration Act 1996, the arbitral procedure should
balance party autonomy with the state's interest in a just and fair
proceeding.
For example, the tribunal is to "act fairly and
impartially" and give "each party a reasonable opportunity of putting
his case and dealing with that of his opponent" while also "adopt[ing]
procedures suitable to the circumstances of the particular case,
avoiding unnecessary delay or expense, so as to provide a fair means
for the resolution of the matters falling to be determined."16 7 The
tribunal has the right to decide all procedural matters, "subject to the
right of the parties to agree any matter."168 Neither joinder nor
intervention is mentioned in the list of procedural matters, which
to be held, in what
includes when and where the proceedings are
69
language, and under what evidentiary rules.1
Although the Arbitration Act 1996 was intended to limit judicial
interference, English courts have retained some authority to supervise
and assist arbitral procedures. 170 For example, a court may enforce a

See Arbitration Act 1996, supra note 158, §§ 34-4 1; Landau, supra
162.
note 160, at 158-59.
163.
See Landau, supra note 160, at 156.
164.
See Arbitration Act 1996, supra note 158, § 46(1)(b) (including, by
implication, the ability to act as amiable compositeurs and ex aequo et bono);
Landau, supranote 160, at 156.
165.
See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supranote 38, at 310-11, 481.
166.
See id. at 311.
167. Arbitration Act 1996, supra note 158, § 33(1).
168.
Id. § 34(1). Neither the parties' nor the tribunal's power is absolute,
however, as "[niothing in this Part shall be construed as excluding the operation
of any rule of law ... as to ... the refusal of recognition or enforcement of an
arbitral award on grounds of public policy." Id. § 81(1).
169.
Id. § 34(2).
170.
See id. §§ 42, 44; Craig, supra note 1, at 52; Landau, supra note 160,
at 157. Under case law developed under the Arbitration Acts of 1950 and 1979,
interlocutory judicial assistance to arbitration usually consisted of one of three
types of orders: (1) Mareva injunctions (pre-award attachment of assets); (2)
discovery orders for documents or witnesses; or (3) orders requiring the claimant
to provide security for costs. See 1 CRAIG ETAL., supranote 38, at 470-71.
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peremptory order of the arbitral tribunal upon a request by the tribunal,
upon a request made by a party, or 'where the parties have agreed that
the powers of the court... shall be available."17 1 In these cases, parties
must exhaust their options in the arbitral forum before petitioning a
court 1 72 In addition to enforcing peremptory orders, both a court and a
tribunal may grant interim relief, including ordering security for costs to
be paid and entering injunctions regarding "any property which is the
subject of the proceedings .. . and which is owned by or is in the
Consolidation of
possession of a party to the proceedings." 173
arbitrations is permitted under the Arbitration Act 1996, but only with
174
the consent of the parties.
If a third party were to attempt to intervene or be joined under the
Arbitration Act 1996, it might try to do so through application of
paragraph 68 of that law. According to paragraph 68, a party may
challenge an award under the Act by alleging a serious procedural
irregularity and substantial injustice.' 7 5 Although this clause could
easily be used to preclude joinder and intervention because such
nonconsensual arbitral measures might be considered "serious
procedmal irregularities," joinder or intervention might be attained if to
not do so would cause "substantial injustice." Unfortunately, this clause
is limited to (1) enforcement of awards and objections by parties,
meaning that any claims for intervention or joinder must wait until the
conclusion of arbitration' 76 and (2) third parties (as outsiders to the
arbitration) may be left without recourse to object.
English courts did address the propriety of joining third parties to
arbitration proceedings under prior arbitration laws. For example, in
Roussel-Uclafv. G.D. Searle & Co. et aL, a French plaintiff brought suit
against a U.S. company and its U.K subsidiary." 77 The U.S. company,
which had an arbitration agreement with the French company
stipulating that all disputes would be resolved by arbitration in the ICC,
requested the English High Court to stay the action pending

171.

Arbitration Act 1996, supranote 158, § 42(2). When a request is made

by a party, the arbitral tribunal must consent and notice must be given to the
other parties. See id.; Landau, supranote 160, at 157.
172. See Arbitration Act 1996, supra note 158, § 42(3).
173. Id. §§ 38, 44.
174. See id. § 35. Some commentators have noted potential problems with
the interaction of English and European Union law in the realm of multi-party
arbitration. See Landau, supra note 160, at 161. For a pre-1996 application of
the English courts' right to consolidate arbitrations under the Arbitration Act of
1950, see supranote 110-19.
175. See Arbitration Act 1996, supra note 158, § 68(2); Landau, supra note
160, at 158.
176. But see Arbitration Act 1996, supra note 158, § 40(2)(b) (requiring
parties to take "without delay any necessary steps to obtain a decision of the
court on a preliminary question of jurisdiction or law").
177. See Roussel-Uclafv. G.D. Searle & Co., [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 225(Ch.),
summarized in 1 CRAIG ET AL., supranote 38, at 96 n.100.
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arbitration. 178 The High Court agreed to do so for the U.S. party but
questioned whether doing so was appropriate for the U.K subsidiary in
light of the absence of an agreement to arbitrate. 179 Ultimately, the High
Court held that "[t]he two parties and their actions are .. . so closely
related ... that it would be right to hold that the subsidiary can establish
that it is within the purview of the arbitration clause, on the basis that it
claiming [sic] through or under' the parent" 8 0° Therefore, the court
granted a stay in favor of both defendants.' 8 ' This type of interpretation,
which relies on the relationship between the parties or potential parties,
could be used to support arguments for joinder or intervention of third
parties in similar cases.
4. France

For many years, France has provided international arbitrations
with special status in French arbitration law, often according a high
8 2
priority to party autonomy and minimal court intervention.1
Therefore, it is not surprising that the French Code of Civil Procedure
(French Code) allows the parties to decide the arbitral procedure with
the arbitrators having the right to do so in the absence of an
agreement by the parties. 18 3

Arbitrators may act as amiable

84
compositeurs if the parties consent to a grant of such authority.'
However, in choosing their arbitral procedure, parties may not violate
international public policy or basic due process rights. 8 5
Because arbitrators are not bound by procedural rules established
by the courts,1 8 6 there can be no arguments for joinder or intervention
based on an analogy to judicial civil procedure. However, the French
Code specifically states that the "guiding principles of litigation," as set

178.

See CRAIG ETAL., supranote 38, at 96 n. 100.

179.

See id.

180.
181.

Id. (quoting English High Court).
Id. Similarly, the House of Lords, England's highest court, held in

dictum that an arbitration clause in a partnership agreement would be binding on

disputes between partners as well as disputes between the partnership and any
of the individual partners. Nova (Jersey) Knit Ltd. v. Karmgam Spinnerei GmbH
(FRG), [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 163, summarized in IV Yearbook 314 (1979).
182. See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supranote 38, at 483-84.

183.

See French Code of Civil Procedure [hereinafter French Code],

translatedand reprinted in REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, app. 17 arts. 1460,
1494.
184. See French Code, supra note 183, arts. 1474, 1497; 1 CRAIG ET AL.,
supranote 38, at 491.
185. See 1 CRAIG ETAL., supranote 38, at 491, 496.
186. See French Code, supra note 183, arts. 1460, 1494. But see 1 CRAIG
ET AL., supra note 38, at 492 (noting that the French courts' power to grant
provisional measures when sitting en rdfr6 "derive[s] from the general rules of
civil procedure, which case law has held compatible with enforcement of an

arbitration agreement").
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forth in certain specific articles, "shall always be applicable to arbitral
proceedings." 187 Among these guiding principles is the notion that "the
object of the dispute may be modified by incidental claims provided they
are sufficiently connected to the original claims." 188 This suggests that
joinder of claims, if not parties, is possible. However, in the right
circumstances, joinder of additional claims might require the
participation of additional parties.
Another of the "guiding principles" of French litigation is the
notion that "[n]o party may be judged unless it has been heard or
summoned."18 9 In the context of international arbitration, this would
appear to mean that a third party's rights could not be affected
without its becoming party to the arbitration, most probably through
the consent of all concerned. However, one might argue that a
significant, though indirect, effect on an absent third party would
90
also be impermissible.1
The French law on international arbitration contains no
provisions specifically permitting domestic courts to intervene in the
arbitral process, suggesting that joinder of or intervention by third
1 91
parties would not be possible absent consent of the parties.
However, the courts do have the ability to grant interim relief en
r~ftr6 (on an urgent basis), in accordance with the corresponding
rules of civil procedure, without affecting the ultimate determination
of the dispute. 19 2 The court retains the right to exercise this sort of
extraordinary jurisdiction even after the arbitral tribunal has been
3
named.19
French court cases involving joinder of third parties emphasize
the sanctity of contract, in accordance with the general approach of
limiting arbitral authority to the terms of the contract.' 9 4 In one

187. French Code, supranote 183, art. 1460.
188. Id. art. 4.
189. Id. art. 14.
190. See supra note 85.
191. See Craig, supra note 1, at 52.
192. See French Code, supranote 183, art. 1479; 1 CRAIG ET AL., supranote
38, at 424 n.7 (citing a case in the French Court of Cassation which held that the
court could order provisional measures intended to preserve or establish
evidence); id. at 492. This provision applies despite the existence of article 1458,
which requires any court to which an arbitrable dispute is submitted to decline
jurisdiction. See French Code, supra note 183, art. 1458; 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra
note 38, at 424.
193. Seel CRAIG ETAL., supranote 38, at 424-25.
194. See Higgins, supra note 11, at 1542. French case law also prohibits
non-consensual consolidation of arbitrations, although the French code is silent
on the issue. See Juliska M. Aponte, Comment, Compulsory Consolidation of
InternationalArbitralProceedings: Effects on Pacta Sunt Servanda and the General
Arbitral Process, 2 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 223, 244 (1994) (discussing BKMI
Industrieanlagen GmbH & Siemens AG v. DUTCO Constr. Co., XV Y.B. COMM.
ARB. 124 (1990)).
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case, a French plaintiff sued a French ship building company, who
then filed a third party complaint against the seller of the engine.' 9 5
The seller of the engine then attempted to join a Danish company
who had acted as a sub-contractor for the manufacture of various
engine parts, despite the fact that those two parties had a binding
arbitration agreement. 196 The Court of Cassation reversed the lower
courts and held that French jurisdictional rules-which were
designed to avoid possible inconsistent results-were inapplicable in
the context of arbitration and could not override the arbitration
clause. 19 7 This result reinforces the likelihood that French courts
will look only to the terms of the contract when deciding issues of
joinder and intervention, and will permit neither the courts nor the
arbitrators to extend their powers to address third party claims.
5. Hong Kong
In its law, Hong Kong differentiates between domestic and
international arbitrations, although parties to an international

arbitration may agree to abide by the rules that apply to domestic
disputes. 19 8 For international arbitrations in which the parties have
not agreed to be bound by the domestic arbitration law of Hong Kong,
the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance states that the UNCITRAL
Model Law is to apply. 19 9 As the Model Law is discussed in Part
III.C.1, infra, the international section of the Hong Kong arbitration
law will not be reviewed here. Instead, the discussion will focus on
the domestic provisions, some of which are quite forward-looking.
One innovative feature of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance
permits non-consensual consolidation of "domestic" arbitrations,
which can include international arbitrations where the parties have
agreed in writing to submit to the rules controlling domestic
arbitrations. 2 0
Under this rule, a party to an arbitration taking

195.

See Soci~t6 Burmeister et Wain Engineering Cie. Lit. v. Soci~t6 Ceusot

Loire et al., Cass., Nov. 8, 1982, Cluent 1984, 151, as cited in DELAUME, supra
note 8, at 313.
196.
See DELAUME, supranote 8, at 313-14.
197.
See id. at 314.
198.
See Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, art. 34C, reprinted in 3
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, IV.Hong Kong.2.a, art. 2M (Eric E.
Bergsten ed., 1995).
199.
See id. art. 34C(1); infra notes 365-87 and accompanying text
(discussing the UNCITRAL Model Law).
200.
See Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, supra note 198, arts. 2L
(application to domestic arbitrations), 2M (application to international arbitration
agreements), 6B (consolidation of arbitrations). Some commentators have argued

that the provision on consolidation applies only to domestic arbitration by virtue

of its being placed in Part II, "Arbitration Within the Colony." See Collins, supra
note 24, at 126 n.29. However, the text of the ordinance states that it applies to
certain international arbitrations as well. See Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance,
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place outside of Hong Kong cannot apply to a Hong Kong court for
consolidation with a Hong Kong arbitration, regardless of that party's
contacts with Hong Kong.
To consolidate, the Hong Kong High Court needs to find that
there are common questions of law or fact, that the rights claimed
arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions, or that
such an order is "desirable" for some other reason. 20 1 The High
Court may consolidate arbitrations "on any terms as it thinks just,"
stay any of the arbitrations, or cause them to be heard in a particular
20 2
order.
The domestically applicable provisions of the Hong Kong
Arbitration Ordinance are silent on the question of joinder or
intervention of third parties. However, it is possible that joinder or
intervention as of right could be ordered as a type of interim relief
This option exists, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary,

because every arbitration agreement shall "be deemed to contain a
provision that the arbitrator or umpire may, if he thinks fit, make an
interim award."20 3 The court also has the ability to grant interim
injunctions and other relief, although that power shall not be taken
2 °4
to prejudice any power vested in the arbitrator.
In 1996, Hong Kong amended its arbitration law by setting forth
certain general powers and responsibilities of the arbitral tribunal
20 5
and special powers of the court concerning arbitral proceedings.
These new provisions cover certain fundamental principles of
procedure and expressly recognize the powers of both the court and
the arbitral tribunal to grant interim relief.2 0 6
In addition,
arbitrators are expressly charged "to act fairly and impartially as
between the parties, giving them a reasonable opportunity to present
their cases and to deal with the cases of their opponents" while using
"procedures that are appropriate to the particular case, avoiding
unnecessary delay and expense, so as to provide a fair means for
20 7
resolving the dispute to which the proceedings relate."

supra note 198, art. 2M; Walter Sterling Surrey & Nancy J. Kellner, International
Arbitration in Hong Kong Law, 406 PLI/COM. 173, 183-84 (1986).
201. See Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, supra note 198, art. 6B(1);
Surrey & Kellner, supra note 200, at 183.
202. Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, supranote 198, art. 6B(1).
203. Id. art. 16. The 1996 Hong Kong Ordinance makes it clear that
arbitrators may grant interim relief as well as interim awards. See Hong Kong
Ordinance No. 75 of 1996 [hereinafter 1996 Hong Kong Ordinance], art. 7,
reprinted in 3 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 198, Hong
Kong.2.a. 1.
204. See Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, supranote 198, art. 14(6).
205. See 1996 Hong Kong Ordinance, supranote 203, art. 7.
206. See id.
207. See id.
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6. Mexico
Following the passage of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA)2 08 in 1993, business opportunities between
United States and Mexican entities have expanded rapidly, leading to
a concurrent increase in the number of actual and potential
international commercial disputes. 20 9 However, as NAFTA does not
set forth any particular dispute resolution mechanism, parties must
210
resort to traditional forms of litigation or arbitration.
Under the Mexican law of international arbitration, parties have
a great deal of discretion in shaping the procedures they will follow,
although they are required to comply with basic notions of due
process such as equal treatment of the parties and the opportunity
for each party to present its case. 2 11 Arbitrators can decide the case
according to law or equity and are permitted to act as amiable
compositeurs or ex aequo et bono.2 12 However, the parties cannot
establish a procedure that conflicts with a mandatory provision of
2 13
Mexican law.
Interim relief from the court is available, either before or during
the arbitration.2 1 4 Such relief is also available from the tribunal "as
is necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute."2 15 As
has been mentioned in the context of discussions of other countries'
arbitration laws, a claim to intervene or join a third party as of right
could be based on either the court's or the tribunal's right to grant
interim relief. However, as in other countries, such an order could be
2 16
subject to immediate challenge by a disgruntled party or parties.
It may be better to allow such challenges to be raised immediately
because requiring parties to wait until after the award has been

208.
605.
209.

See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1993, 32 I.L.M.
See William E. Mooz, Jr. & Alejandro Ortega, Options for Resolving

Commercial Disputes in the NAFTA Era, in 1 DOING BUSINESS IN MEXIco 3-1, 3-2
(Philip T. von Mehren ed., 1997).
210.
See id. at 3-2 to 3-3.
211.
See Code of Commerce, Title IV, Book V, Commercial Arbitration
[hereinafter Mexican Code], art. 1434, translated and reprinted in 4 INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, IV.Mexico.2.a (Eric E. Bergsten ed., 1996) (noting the
requirement of equality and opportunity to present one's case); id. art. 1435
(noting the freedom to agree to arbitral procedure); Mooz & Ortega, supra note

209, at 3-23 to 3-24.
212.
See Mexican Code, supra note 211, art. 1445; Mooz & Ortega, supra

note 209, at 3-24 n.111.
213.
See Mexican Code, supranote 211, art. 1457(I)(d).
214.
See id. art. 1425.
215.
Id. art. 1433.
216. "A plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority
shall be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond the scope of its
authority is raised during the arbitral proceedings." Id. art. 1432.
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handed down often results in unnecessary expenditures of time and
money.
Mexico also follows the approach used by other nations and
allows arbitrations to be terminated if the arbitrators find that the
proceedings have "become unnecessary or impossible," thus
suggesting that an arbitrator may halt an arbitration if it is
impossible to proceed without a third party. 2 17 Intervention and
joinder of third parties over the objection of existing parties is not

without risk, however, as an award may be set aside if the "arbitral
procedure [is] not in accordance with the agreement of the
2 18
parties."
7. The Netherlands
Procedures for arbitrations taking place in The Netherlands are
determined by the parties or, in the absence of the parties'
agreement, by the arbitrator. 2 19 Whatever the procedure, however,
parties must be treated equally and be given an opportunity to
substantiate their claims and present their cases. 220 The arbitrator
is permitted to act as an amiable compositeurupon the agreement of
221
the parties.
Interim measures are available from both the court and the
arbitral tribunal.2 2 2 Interestingly, the Netherlands Arbitration Act of
1986 (Netherlands Act) appears to expressly recognize Dutch courts'
ability to grant interim relief in arbitrations taking place outside the
state's territorial boundaries. 223 This authority will obviously be
helpful to parties with some sort of contact with The Netherlands,
since they can apply to Dutch courts for assistance as well as to
courts in the forum state and state of enforcement.
One of the most novel aspects of the Netherlands Act is its
approach to consolidation of arbitrations. 2 24 If two (or more)
arbitrations are taling place in The Netherlands and are somehow
"connected," then they may be consolidated by request of one of the
parties, even over the objection of other parties. 22 5 Consolidation is

217.
218.
219.
art. 1036,

Id. art. 1449.
Id. art. 1457(I)(d).
See Netherlands Arbitration Act 1986 [hereinafter Netherlands Act],
26 I.L.M. 921, translated and reprinted in REDFERN & HUNTER, supra

note 5, app. 18.
220. See id. art. 1039(1).
221. See id. art. 1054(3).
222. See id. arts. 1022(2), 1049.
223. See id. art. 1074.
224. See id. art. 1046; Collins, supranote 24, at 126 n.29; Craig, supranote
1, at 52; Hoellering, supranote 9, at 48.
225. See Netherlands Act, supranote 219, art. 1046; Hoellering, supranote
9, at 48. However, prior to consolidation, the President of the District Court in
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not automatic upon request; the court may grant the request wholly
or in part, or even reject it.2 26 In addition, the parties may opt out of

this provision. 2 2 7 Nevertheless, this is a noteworthy innovation for
those who support joinder and intervention, because a liberal
consolidation policy could eventually lead to liberal treatment of third
parties. One of the many positive aspects of the Netherlands Act's
consolidation provision is that the issue of consolidation is decided
by a court at a very early stage, thus avoiding the possibility that the
award will be set aside later on the grounds that the arbitrators
exceeded their authority by consolidating the arbitrations. 22 2 This
will avoid unnecessary cost and delay if the consolidation order is
overturned.
The Netherlands is also among the few states to address third
parties' interests in an arbitration. According to article 1045, "a third
party who has an interest in the outcome of the arbitral proceedings"
may ask to intervene in the proceedings. 2 2 9 Similarly, a party seeking
indemnification from a third party may serve a notice of joinder on
that third party. 23 0 The arbitrators will decide whether to permit the
third party to participate in the proceedings, but they must obtain all
23
parties' consent in writing before joinder or intervention is allowed. '
If the arbitrators allow the third party to participate in the
arbitration, the third party becomes a party to the arbitral
proceedings and the arbitrators determine the further conduct of the
2 32
proceedings.
8. Sweden
Sweden has two separate arbitration acts, one concerning
domestic arbitrations and one concerning foreign arbitrations. The
Swedish Arbitration Act of 1929 (Swedish Act) concerns any
233
arbitration that takes place or is to take place in Sweden.
According to the Swedish Act, arbitrators are to conduct the

Amsterdam (who has the sole power to consolidate arbitrations) will hear the
views of the parties and of the arbitrator. See Netherlands Act, supra note 219,
art. 1046(2).
226. See Netherlands Act, supranote 219, art. 1046(2).
227. See id. art. 1046(1); Hoellering, supra note 9, at 48.
228. See Gaillard, supra note 123, at 24-25.
229. See Netherlands Act, supra note 219, art. 1045(1).
230. See id. art. 1045(2).
231. See id. art. 1045(3).
232. See id. art. 1045(4).
233. See The Swedish Arbitration Act of 1929 [hereinafter Swedish Act], § 4
(also taking jurisdiction over Swedish residents), translated and reprinted in 4
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, IV.Sweden.2.a (Kenneth R. Simmonds
ed., 1992). The Swedish Act was amended in 1976. See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra
note 38, at 516.
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arbitration "as far as possible, in accordance with the instructions of
the parties and shall otherwise deal with the case in an impartial,
practical and speedy manner."2 34 An award may be set aside "if,
through no fault of the party, any... irregularity of procedure has
in probability may be assumed to have influenced
occurred, which
2 35
the decision."
The Swedish Act of 1929 Concerning Foreign Arbitration
Agreements and Awards addresses arbitrations taking place outside
Sweden. 2 3 6 According to this second act, the law of the forum state
applies to these arbitrations. 2 37 Swedish courts have no jurisdiction
if the agreement is (1) valid under both Swedish and the relevant
foreign law and (2) at least one party objects to the intervention of the
2 38
Swedish courts.
Although there is no express provision in Swedish arbitration
law concerning interim relief, district courts in Sweden may order
interim measures in order to aid domestic arbitration and compel the
production of evidence.2 39 However, it is unclear to what extent such
interim measures are available to parties whose arbitrations are
pending outside Sweden. 2 4° Indeed, the Swedish courts' role in
arbitration is very limited. They are not permitted to interfere with
arbitral proceedings, but they may assist in the resolution of the
dispute. 24 1

In order to give full effect to party autonomy, Sweden has
declined to enact a law requiring compulsory consolidation. 2 42 There
any equitable powers to arbitral
is also no provision extending
2
tribunals or courts in Sweden. 4

234.

Swedish Act, supranote 233, § 13.

Id. § 21(4); see also 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 523 (discussing
235.
voidable awards).

236. See Swedish Act of 1929 Concerning Foreign Arbitration Agreements
and Awards § 1 (as amended and in force on 1 January 1984) [hereinafter
Swedish Foreign Arbitration Act], translated and reprinted in 5 INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 235, at IV.Sweden.2.a.
237. See id. § 2.
238. See id. § 3.
239. See Swedish Foreign Arbitration Act, supra note 236, § 7; 1 CRAIG ET
AL., supranote 38, at 519-21, 526.

240. See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 520 (noting that the Swedish
Justice Department has issued an opinion stating that orders for attachments
may be based on suits "before a foreign court or other foreign authority if its
decision may be enforced here").
241.
Seeid.at521.
242. See Hoellering, supranote 9, at 48.
243. See Swedish Foreign Arbitration Act, supra note 236, § 7; see also 1
CRAIG ETAL., supra note 38, at 526.
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9. Switzerland
International arbitration in Switzerland is currently governed by

the Private International Law Act 1987 (Swiss Act).2 4 4

Under the

Swiss Act, the parties may determine the arbitral procedure
themselves through the use of various arbitral rules or by submitting
to the procedural law of the state of their choice. 2 45 Where there is a
lack of agreement, the arbitral tribunal shall determine the
arbitration procedure but shall in any event "assure equal treatment
of the parties and the right of the parties to be heard in an
2
adversarial procedure." "6
Arbitral tribunals may order interim protective relief, and, if the
parties do not comply with the tribunal's order, may request the
assistance of the court.24 7 The court is also empowered to provide
judicial assistance in the first instance; there is no need for2a48party to
seek relief from the arbitrator before resorting to the courts.
The parties can agree to permit the arbitrators to decide ex
aequo et bono.2 4 9 Awards may only be challenged for limited
reasons, such as the failure to respect the equality of the parties,
encroachment on the right of the parties to an adversarial procedure,
25 0
or incompatibility with international public policy.
10. Taiwan
Arbitration in Taiwan is governed by the Commercial Arbitration Act

of 1961, a somewhat brief statute in comparison with other nations'

244.
See Switzerland Private International Law Act 1987 [hereinafter Swiss
Act], 27 I.L.M. 37, translated and reprinted in REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5,
app. 19. Although the Swiss Act does not formally supersede the Intercantonal
Arbitration Convention of March 27, 1969 (Swiss Convention), which had applied
to international arbitration before passage of the Swiss Act, the provisions of the
Swiss Convention are applicable to international arbitrations if the parties so
choose. See Swiss Act, supra, art. 176(2); 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 541;
Charles Poncet & Emmanuel Gaillard, Introductory Note, 27 I.L.M. 37, 37-39.
Most people will avoid invoking the Swiss Convention, however, since by so doing
they open the arbitral award up to broad judicial review and challenge on the
See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 542-43.
ground of "arbitrariness."
Therefore, the provisions of the Swiss Convention will not be discussed here.
See Swiss Act, supranote 244, art. 182.
245.
See id.; see also 1 CRAIG ET AL, supranote 38, at 545.
246.
See Swiss Act, supranote 244, art. 183(1)-(2).
247.
248.
See id. art. 185; 1 CRAIG ET AL., supranote 38, at 425, 545.
249.
See Swiss Act, supra note 244, art. 187(2); 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note
38, at 546.
250.
See Swiss Act, supra note 244, art. 190(2)(e); 1 CRAIG ETAL., supranote
38, at 548-59.
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laws.25 1 Party autonomy is encouraged under Taiwanese law, and the
parties are permitted to establish the arbitral procedure, with the
arbitrator doing so if the parties cannot agree. 25 2 In contrast to nations
that explicitly separate procedures for arbitration and litigation, the
Taiwanese arbitration law states that, "[cloncerning the proceedings of
arbitration, a court shall apply, apart from the provisions of this Act, the
stipulations of the Non-Litigation Act, and apply mutatis mutandis the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, if no relevant provisions can be
found in the Non-Litigation Act"25 3 Notably, the Commercial Arbitration
Act is silent regarding both joinder and intervention.
This link between litigation and arbitration procedure is
explicitly recognized with respect to discovery, as courts assisting
arbitral tribunals are given the same powers they have in civil
litigation concerning the search for evidence. 25 4 Interestingly, even if
an arbitrator or court were to order third party intervention or joinder
in accordance with Taiwanese civil procedure, that act may not be
appealable, at least not immediately, because "[a]rbitration
proceedings are not subject to objections and exceptions by either
party. The arbitrator or arbitrators may proceed with the arbitration
and make an award notwithstanding the raising of an objection or
exception by any party."2 5 5 In addition, the grounds for overturning
or refusing to execute an arbitral award, though numerous, do not
include any that would provide a basis for overturning an award
following an objection to joinder or intervention of a third party.25 6
11. United States
In the United States, international arbitration is addressed at
the federal level through the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the second

chapter of which implements the New York Convention.257 Various
states have also passed their own international arbitration measures,
2 58
which apply to the extent that they do not conflict with the FAA.

251.

See Commercial Arbitration Act, 1961 (as amended 1982) [hereinafter

Taiwan Act], translatedand reprintedin 3 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,

IV.China (Taiwan).2.a (Kenneth R. Simmonds ed., 1992).
252. See id. art. 12.
253. Id.art. 35.
254. See id. art. 16.
255. Id. art. 17.
256. See id. arts. 22-23.
257. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-02 (1990) [hereinafter
FAA], reprintedin REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, app. 20; 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra
note 38, at 567; David E. Wagoner, Interim Relief in InternationalArbitration:
Enforcement Is A SubstantialProblem, DIsP. RES. J., Oct. 1996, at 68, 70.
258. See 1 CRAIG ETAL., supra note 38, at 567-68; Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v.
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475-79 (1989);
Hoellering, supra note 9, at 45; George K. Walker, Trends in State Legislation
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Since the FAA is silent on the issue of intervention and joinder, state
25 9
statutes appear to be permitted to fill the gap.
The FAA is, when compared with other countries' legislative

enactments, rather sparse. Even though domestic arbitration rules

are allowed to fill certain holes, 2 60 there is still considerably less
statutory language than in other nations' codes.
Because the U.S. statute on arbitration is not very explicit, there is a
discernible link between arbitral procedure and civil procedure, and
some elements of U.S. civil procedure have been incorporated into
international arbitration taking place in the United States. For example,
most U.S. courts deem the right to cross-examination to be essential to
the right to a fair hearing and will not permit arbitrations operating
under U.S. procedure to adopt a civil-law approach to the examination of
witnesses. 2 6 1 Arbitrators should obviously take these elements into
consideration, as awards may be vacated for violation of procedural
fairness if that violation prejudices a party's right 2 62 U.S. courts are
given this power of annulment to "control the basic integrity of the
arbitral process where one of the parties feels that the procedure was not
what was bargained for in the agreement to arbitrate. 2 63 Obviously,
these policies raise concerns for those who would like to introduce
intervention and joinder as of right into U.S. arbitration law, as a party to
the oringal arbitration can easily argue that it did not bargain for an
26 4
arbitration that included a third party.
U.S. law on arbitration seems to be leaning in favor of
consolidation where common issues of law and fact exist and, for the
most part, this policy has been based on efficiency, economy,
expedience, and equity. 2 65
However, the federal courts are not
united in their approach, and a number of jurisdictions have held

Governing InternationalArbitration, 17 N.C. J. INTL L. & COM. REG. 419, 423-24
(1992).
259.
See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supranote 38, at 568 (noting that "[t]he simple rule

that federal law pre-empts conflicting state law is not always simple to put into
practice . . . . Particularly obscure is the impact of a state law with no
corresponding provision in the federal statute"); New England Energy, Inc. v.
Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988); Hoellering, supranote 9, at 45;

Wagoner, supra note 257, at 70. For a full discussion of federal preemption in
arbitration law, see Carlos E. Loumiet's Introductory Note to the Florida
International Arbitration Act, 26 I.L.M. 949.
260. See 9 U.S.C. § 208 (1990).
261. See l CRAIG ETAL., supranote 38, at 585.
262. See id. at 585-86 (noting also that awards may be vacated for
exceeding arbitral authority). The FAA does not explicitly allow an award to be
voided for violation of public policy. See id. at 586.
263. Id.
264. Parties may also argue that the arbitral award should be annulled due
to the arbitrator exceeding his authority by allowing third parties to join or
intervene in the arbitration over the objections of the existing parties. See id.
265. See Hoeliering, supra note 9, at 44.
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that non-consensual consolidation constitutes a violation of the
2 66

fundamental contractual characteristics of arbitration.
Several federal cases have addressed intervention and joinder as of

right, at least in the context of domestic arbitration, thus suggesting the
circumstances under which third party participation would be permitted
in international arbitrations. The standard for intervention is based on
Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and appears to be
interpreted as it is in civil litigation. Cases often deal with the review of
arbitral awards and whether non-parties to the arbitration should be
allowed to intervene in the appeal, even though they are not technically
bound by the award.2 6 7 Where the court finds that the arbitration
"directly" affects the third parties' interests, it will generally allow
intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a).2 6 8 Where
intervention under Rule 24(a) is sought, "no independent ground of
2 69

jurisdiction need be asserted."

Conversely, intervention by a third party under Rule 24(a) may
be denied if the court finds that the third party's interest is

"adequately represented by existing parties."2 70

A third party's

266.
See id. The Second, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
prohibit non-consensual consolidation. See United Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998
F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1993); American Centennial Ins. Co. v. National Cas. Co., 951
F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1991); Baesler v. Continental Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193,
1195 (8th Cir. 1990); Protective Life Ins. Corp. v. Lincoln Natl Life Ins. Corp., 873
F.2d 281, 282 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Del E. Webb Constr. v. Richardson
Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 1987); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western
Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1984); Hoellering, supranote 9, at
45. Several states have passed legislation regarding consolidation of arbitration.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1281.3, 1297.23 (West 1982 & Supp.); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 684.12 (West 1992) (noting when consolidation of arbitrations is
permitted in international arbitrations); GA. CODE ANN. 9-9-6(e)-(h) (1993); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 2A (West 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2712.52 (West
1994) (allowing consolidation only where all parties consent); DELAUME, supra
note 8, at 313.

267.

See, e.g., Association of Contracting Plumbers v. Local No. 2, United

Ass'n of Journeymen, 841 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1988); F.W. Woolworth Co. v.
Miscellaneous Warehousemen's Union, Local No. 781, 629 F.2d 1204, 1213 (7th
Cir. 1980). Other cases involve whether third parties who are judgment creditors
of a party to an arbitration can assert an interest in an arbitral award in favor of
that party. See Holbom Oil Trading Ltd. v. Interpetrol Bermuda Ltd., 658 F.
Supp. 1205, 1206-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (decided under section 203 of the United
States Arbitration Act). Courts have held that in such situations, intervention as
of right under Rule 24 is proper. Id. at 1209.
268.
See, e.g., Association of Contracting Plumbers, 841 F.2d at 467 (noting
the existence of "substantial interest in the arbitrations"); F.W. Woolworth Co.,
629 F.2d at 1213.
269.
Association of Contracting Plumbers, 841 F.2d at 467 (citing 3B JAMES
WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.18, at 198-99 (2d ed. 1987)).
270.
Acuff v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, 404 F.2d 169, 171-72
(5th Cir. 1968); see, e.g., Liz Claiborne, Inc. v. Mademoiselle Knitware, Inc., No.
96-C2064 (RWS), 1996 WL 346352, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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request to intervene will also be denied if its interest is only indirectly
271
affected by the arbitration.
Joinder of third parties in arbitration is decided under Rule 19,
just as it is in civil litigation. The analysis typically focuses on
whether the third party's absence will deny complete relief to the
parties and whether the third party has an interest in the
arbitration.2 7 2 The mere fact that a party will have to undergo
piecemeal litigation in the absence of a third party does not make the
2 73
third party indispensable to the arbitration.
At the state level, two jurisdictions, South Carolina and Utah,
have passed legislation providing for joinder of necessary third
parties to an arbitration. 2 74 Unusually, the South Carolina law does
not require the party being joined to consent to the process. 275 The
Utah law avoids this problem by requiring joined parties to be "a
party to the arbitration agreement."2 76 However, neither provision

discusses the right of a non-party to intervene in the arbitration, and
the Utah law, by requiring a joined party to be a signatory to the
arbitration agreement, may preclude intervention by a stranger to the
contract.
B. Rules of Arbitral Institutions
When parties are drafting their arbitration agreements, they
have two choices before them: they can provide for an ad hoc
arbitration (i.e., an arbitration in which the parties create their own
procedural rules and handle the administration of the arbitration
themselves) or they can provide for an arbitration under the auspices

271.

See Liz Claiborne, Inc., 1996 WL 346352, at *3.

272.

See Conntech Dev. Co. v. University of Conn. Educ. Properties, Inc.,

102 F.3d 677, 682 (2d Cir. 1996).
273.
See Snap-on Tools Corp. v. Mason, 18 F.3d 1261, 1267 (5th Cir.
1994); see also Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 1242-43
(1985) (rejecting arguments based on efficiency in the context of the joinder of
arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims and ruling that "the preeminent concern of
Congress in passing the [Arbitration] Act was to enforce private agreements into
which parties had entered, and that concern requires that we rigorously enforce
agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is 'piecemeal' litigation").
274.
See Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 522.
Florida's International
Arbitration Act has also been cited for its provisions on consolidation, although it
is silent on the issue of joinder and intervention.
See Florida International
Arbitration Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. Ch. 684 (West 1990). Nevertheless, the Florida
International Arbitration Act allows parties to grant arbitrators the power to act as
amiable compositeurs or ex aequo et bono, which increases their equitable power to
allow joinder or intervention. See id. § 684.17; Lecuyer-Thieffry & Thieffry, supra
note 2, at 592-93.
275.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-60 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985); Stipanowich,
supranote 1, at 522-23.
276.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31a-9 (1997); Stipanowich, supranote 1, at 523.
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of any one of a number of international arbitral institutions. 2 7 7 Most
parties wisely choose to have their arbitration administered by a
professional body, as the benefits of utilizing the rules set forth by
one of these institutions include heightened
predictability and
278
uniformity of arbitral procedures and awards.
As a result of the increasing importance of international
arbitration and the push for delocalization, many administering
institutions have developed where once there were but a few wellknown and well-respected institutional bodies. During the last
decade or so, many arbitral institutions have amended their rules to
adapt to changing circumstances and, in some instances, have acted
as the initiators of important procedural change. 2 7 9 In many ways, it
is because of arbitral institutions' unique position-private bodies
specializing in international arbitration, accountable to no
constituency other than the parties they serve-that they are able to
educate parties about potential reforms in arbitral procedure and
provide default rules about novel aspects of arbitration law that

legislatures or courts are unwilling or unable to implement.280
Therefore, a change in the rules on joinder or intervention of parties
might begin with these international arbitral organizations.
Because a full review of every provision of every arbitral body's
procedural rules would exceed the scope of this Article, this section
will highlight only the relevant rules of some of the more important or
innovative administrative agencies.
As with the discussion of
national laws, the primary focus will be on those provisions that
provide an explicit or implicit basis for granting or denying
intervention and joinder in an existing arbitration. In addition, this
section will concentrate primarily on setting forth the rules of the
arbitration institutions as they currently exist; Part IV will then
integrate the rules into arguments for and against joinder and
intervention.
1. American Arbitration Association
According to published reports, the AAA is the largest arbitral
institution in the world in terms of facilities and caseload, taking on
over 60,000 cases a year.28 1 Although the vast majority of the AAA's
cases involve purely U.S. domestic disputes, as many as 200 per year

277.
See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supranote 38, at 50-52 (describing problems with
ad hoc arbitration); Slate, supra note 6, at 52-53 (describing ad hoc arbitration
and noting that the parties may create their own set of procedures or incorporate

by reference the rules of a domestic legal system).
278. See Haubold, supranote 4, at 45; Slate, supranote 6, at 43, 47, 52-59.
279.
280.
281.

See Rau & Sherman, supranote 8, at 94, 119.
See id. at 99, 117-18; Slade, supra note 6, at 60-61.
See Laturno, supra note 2, at 383 n.200 (citing 1990 figures).
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are international in scope. 28 2 The AAA has promulgated several sets
of arbitration rules, each focusing on a different industry or practice
area. The bulk of this discussion will focus on the AAA International
Rules.
Issues concerning joinder of third parties arise relatively
frequently in AAA-administrated arbitrations, and the AAA's
unwritten policy is to proceed with the arbitration as filed by the
claimant, even if separate contracts are involved, so that parties may
proceed jointly if they so desire. 28 3 However, if a party objects to
proceeding jointly, the arbitration will be separated unless a court
orders otherwise. 28 4 The AAA's experience has been that joinder is
more likely in vertical disputes (such as those involving an owner, a
general contractor, and a subcontractor) than in horizontal disputes
(such as those involving an owner, a contractor, and an architect).285
The problem faced by the AAA is that although it permits nonconsensual consolidation if ordered by a court, many courts view the

absence

of explicit language

in the AAA Rules

concerning

consolidation as evidence that they cannot order consolidation
without the AAA's permission. 28 6
This creates an unfortunate
"catch-22" situation for third parties who would like to intervene or
be joined in an existing AAA arbitration.2 8 7
The AAA Case
Administration Advisory Committee is beginning to address this
situation, however, and has proposed certain amendments to the
rules that would permit not only consolidation of arbitrations but
2 88
joinder of parties in certain circumstances.
One of the fundamental principles of arbitration under the AAA
International Rules is that "the tribunal may conduct the arbitration
in whatever manner it considers appropriate, provided that the
parties are treated with equality and that each party has the right to
be heard and is given a fair opportunity to present its case."28 9 To
carry out these ends, the tribunal "may take whatever interim
measures it deems necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the
dispute."2 90 However, parties need not rely solely on the arbitrator
for provisional relief, as the AAA International Rules do not consider

282.
See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 6 (estimating that the AAA
handles about 120 international arbitrations annually); Laturno, supranote 2, at
383 (stating that in 1990 the AAA handled 200 international arbitrations).
283.
See Hoellering, supra note 9, at 46; Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 497
n.130.
284.
See Hoellering, supranote 9, at 46.

285.

See id.

286. See Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 497-98.
287. See id.
288. See Hoellering, supranote 9, at 49.
289. AAA International Rules, art. 16(1), reprinted in REDFERN &
supranote 5, app. 4 [hereinafter AAA International Rules].

290.

Id. art. 22(1).

HUNTER,
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a request for relief from a court to be inconsistent with or constitute a
waiver of the arbitration agreement. 2 9 1 The tribunal may decide as
an amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono only if the parties have
2 92
authorized it to do so.
Interestingly, the AAA International Rules state that if the
continuation of the arbitration becomes "impossible," then the
arbitral tribunal shall terminate the proceedings. 2 93 This provision
might be effective in persuading recalcitrant parties to consent to
intervention by or joinder of a third party, if arbitrators were willing
and able to hold that it would be impossible to proceed fairly without
the participation of the third party.2 94 In such a situation, the
original parties would then have the choice of allowing the third party
to participate in the arbitration or having the arbitration terminated
and the dispute litigated.
2. International Chamber of Commerce

Although the AAA is utilized primarily by North Americans, the
International Chamber of Commerce has a much more global appeal
and is, in fact, one of the most popular and most respected arbitral
institutions in existence today.2 95 With sixty years of experience in
international arbitration, the ICC has overseen well over 5,000
arbitrations2 9 6 and handles several hundred new cases a year, with
claims ranging from several million to the tens of thousands of U.S.
dollars.2 97 According to some commentators, the ICC is "frequently"
asked to join in an arbitral proceeding non-signatories to the
2 98
arbitration agreement.

291.
292.

Id. art. 22(3).
Id. art. 29(3).

293.

Id. art. 30(2).

294.
See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 19, 24; supra notes 12-19 (defining joinder
and intervention as of right) and accompanying text.
295.
See Laturno, supra note 2, at 385.
296.
See 1 CRAIG ET AL, supra note 38, at 4; Stephen R. Bond, Recent
Developments in International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration, 477 PLI/CoMM
55, 57-58 (1988); Laturno, supranote 2, at 385.
297.
See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 5 (noting that 300 new requests
for arbitration are filed each year on average); Bond, Recent Developments, supra
note 298, at 59 (citing 1987 figures); Jim Kelly, Warring Andersen Sisters Keep
Mum Ahead of ParisCourt Case, FIN. TIMES, May 13, 1998, at 14 (noting the costs
of large arbitration cases and citing the number of new cases in 1997).

298.

1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 95; see also Bond, ICC Experience,

supranote 22, at 33 (noting that the ICC Court refused to approve certain Terms
of Reference where the arbitral tribunal had permitted a potential intervenor to
sign the Terms, in contravention of the rule that only "parties" are permitted to
sign the Terms); infra notes 318-21 (discussing the ICC's group of companies
approach).
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As of January 1, 1998, the ICC's amended Rules of Arbitration
(New ICC Rules) came into effect.2 99 However, the rules that were
previously in force (Old ICC Rules) 30 0 still apply to arbitrations
commenced prior to January 1, 1998, and to arbitrations of contracts
that state that the ICC rules in effect at the time of the signing of the
contract are to apply. 3 0 ' Although there are several differences
between the New and Old ICC Rules, only some are relevant to this
discussion. Both sets of rules will be reviewed below.
Under both the old and the new approach, the arbitral procedure
is governed by the ICC rules; where the rules are silent, the parties
(or, in the absence of agreement, the arbitrator) may decide the
applicable procedure, either with or without reference to any
procedural law. 3° 2 The New ICC Rules contain additional language
requiring the arbitrators to "act fairly and impartially and ensure that
each party has a reasonable opportunity to present its case."3 0 3 In
carrying out their duties, arbitrators under either set of rules may act
as amiable compositeurs if the parties so agree, a somewhat common
304
event.
Both sets of rules are subject to the general proviso that, "[i]n all
matters not expressly provided for in these Rules, the [ICC] and the
[arbitrator] shall act in the spirit of these Rules and shall make every
effort to make sure that the Award is enforceable at law."30 5 This
language could have a deleterious effect on the development of a third
party right to intervene or be joined in an ICC arbitration, as an
argument may be made that joinder or intervention by third parties
constitutes an unwarranted extension of the arbitrator's authority,
and thus would make an arbitral award unenforceable.
Interim relief from the courts is expressly made available under
the Old ICC Rules, either before or after the case file has been
transmitted to the arbitral tribunal.3 0 6 The New ICC Rules make it
more clear that interim relief is available from the arbitral tribunal as

299. See New ICC Rules, supra note 56.
300. See International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Conciliation and
Arbitration in force as of January 1, 1988, reprintedin REDFERN & HUNTER, supra
note 5, app. 6 [hereinafter Old ICC Rules].
301. See New ICC Rules, supra note 56, art. 6(1).
302. See New ICC Rules, supra note 56, art. 15(1); Old ICC Rules, supra
note 302, art. 11.
303. New ICC Rules, supranote 56, art. 15(2).
304. See id. art. 17(3) (permitting arbitrators to assume powers of amiable
compositeur or ex aequo et bono upon agreement of the parties); Old ICC Rules,
supranote 300, art 13(1)(g); 1 CRAIG ETAL., supranote 38, at 312.
305. New ICC Rules, supranote 56, art. 35; Old ICC Rules, supranote 302,
art. 26.
306. See Old ICC Rules, supranote 300, art. 8(5). The Old ICC Rules allow
application for interim relief after the file is transmitted to the arbitrator only in
"exceptional circumstances." Id.
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well as the courts.30 7 Judicial relief may be sought either before the
case file is sent to the arbitral tribunal or, in extraordinary
308
circumstances, after the file is sent.
Although the Old ICC Rules are silent on the issue ofjoinder, the
Internal Rules of the International Court of Arbitration (as set forth
as appendix II to the Old ICC Rules) include language on the joinder
of claims, permitting additional claims to be brought between the

same parties when those new claims have a "connection" with the
legal relationship already at issue in arbitration.3 0 9 This may be
interpreted as constituting the first step toward a right of third
parties to intervene or be joined in an ICC arbitration. However,
under both sets of ICC rules, the presence of "persons not involved in
the proceedings" at the hearing is strictly prohibited in the absence of
the parties' and arbitrators' consent. 310 This will necessarily limit
third parties' ability to attend hearings and thus to join or intervene
in cases. In addition, the ICC places a strong emphasis on the
existence of a binding arbitration agreement between the parties
naming the ICC as the arbitral forum. 311 This preoccupation is

reflected in the fact that both sets of rules state that no arbitration
can proceed in the ICC in the absence of a prima face arbitration
agreement binding all parties.3 1 2 Under this analysis, any third
party that is not a party to an enforceable arbitration agreement with
all other parties has no hope of joining or intervening in the
arbitration.3 1 3 Therefore, third parties to an ICC arbitration may
intervene or be joined only if all parties, both existing and incoming,
agree. This rule seems to apply despite the fact that consolidation of
arbitrations is possible, in some cases, over the objection of the
parties and may be due to the fact that the ICC rules "do not foresee
the administration under contentious circumstances of triangular or
31 4
multi-polar disputes."

307. See New ICC Rules, supranote 56, art. 23(1).
308. See id. art. 23(2). Seeking relief from a court does not constitute an
infringement or waiver of the arbitration agreement under either set of rules. See
id. art. 23(2); Old ICC Rules, supranote 302, art. 8(5).
309. See Old ICC Rules, supra note 300, app. II 13; cf. New ICC Rules,
supranote 56, art. 19 (discussing new claims).
310. New ICC Rules, supra note 56, art. 21(3); Old ICC Rules, supra note
302, art. 15(4).
311. See Schwartz, Dutco, supranote 49, at 1,3.
312. See New ICC Rules, supra note 56, art. 6; Old ICC Rules, supra note
302, art. 7.
313. See Bond, ICC Experience, supra note 22, at 35 (noting the possibility

of finding implied consent in some cases); Schwartz, Dutco, supra note 49, at 3-5

(noting a narrow ICC interpretation of what constitutes a single arbitration
agreement).
314.

Joachim A. Kuckenburg, Presenting Claims in ICC Arbitration, 10

L. PRACTiCUM 34, 41-42 (1997).
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Unlike the Old ICC Rules, the New ICC Rules make specific
provision for arbitration with multiple parties.3 15
However, this
language deals specifically with the problems associated with naming
arbitrators and does not discuss joinder or intervention of third
parties.
Despite the apparent harshness of the ICC toward third parties,
the ICC's actual practice concerning joinder of non-signatories to the
3 16
arbitration agreement has followed a "common-sense" approach.
For example, a respondent in an arbitration cannot object when
claimants are parents and/or subsidiaries of a company with which
the respondent has a signed arbitration agreement, particularly if the

evidence demonstrates that the parties intended there to be no
difference in a practical business sense between the parent and
3 17
subsidiaries.
In those instances where the ICC has permitted a non-signatory
company to join an arbitration, the non-signatory has wanted to
participate; it may be more difficult or, indeed, impossible to join an
unwilling non-signatory entity in an ICC arbitration. For example,
the ICC will not force a company within a group of companies to
comply with the provisions of an arbitration agreement signed by
another company in the group where it cannot be demonstrated that
the non-signatory company "would have accepted the arbitration
3 18
agreement."
The idea that once a company signs an arbitration agreement it
has bound not only itself, but also all companies that it controls, is
called the "group theory," and it has a number of supporters.3 19 In
fact, the ICC has utilized the group theory to join a number of
seemingly remote parties in an arbitration.3 2 0 When deciding whether
to apply the group theory to a particular case, the ICC will look not
only to the express contractual language linking the companies, but
also at the intent of the parties to see if there was an intention to

315.

See New ICC Rules, supra note 56, art. 10.

316.
See 1 CRAIG ETAL., supranote 38, at 95-96.
317.
See Isover St Goain v. Dow Chemical France, ICC Case 4131, cited in
1 CRAIG ET AL., supranote 38, at 96-97; DELAUME, supra note 8, at 310. In this
case, the respondent had signed an arbitration agreement with the Swiss
subsidiary of Dow Chemical, although that subsidiary was not a party to the
arbitration. See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supranote 38, at 96-97. Instead, claimants were

the Dow Chemical parent company and the French subsidiary. See id. After
reviewing the parties' correspondence, the ICC concluded that the respondent
had intended to enter into an arbitration agreement with the entire Dow group.
See id.
318.

ICC Case 1975 JDI 934, quoted in 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 98

(citing several ICC cases in accord).
319.
See I CRAIG ET AL., supranote 38, at 98; see also DELAUME, Supra note
8, at 310 (discussing the "group of companies" concept in international trade).
320.
See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supranote 38, at 99-100 (discussing various ICC
cases in which the group theory has been used).
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create an "integrated contractual relationship subject to one single
32 1
arbitration."
However, despite the growing acceptance of joinder in group
contract cases, joinder of non-signatories to ICC arbitrations,
3 22
especially in non-consensual situations, remains controversial.
Indeed, the ICC's position on joinder is not the only issue to be
resolved, since the national courts must also decide whether to
enforce an award in which non-signatories to the contract were
3 23
joined.

3. International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Although the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes is not as widely used as more general arbitral
institutions such as the ICC, it has set forth a number of very
detailed Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (ICSID
Rules).3 24 In this system, the arbitral tribunal retains a great detail
of discretion and is given the power to "make the orders required for
the conduct of the proceeding," although it is also charged to "apply
any agreement between the parties on procedural matters."3 25 This
wide grant of residual discretion may facilitate joinder or intervention
of third parties in situations where the contract is silent or where
only one party objects to a third party's participation.
The ICSID Rules recognize that interim or provisional measures
(such as, possibly, intervention or joinder of third parties) may be
necessary during the pendency of the arbitration "for the preservation
of [a party's] rights."32 6 Upon a party's request or on its own
initiative, the arbitral tribunal may recommend that provisional
measures be taken.3 2 7 The use of the term "recommend" may mean
that the tribunal has only the power to suggest that the parties
comply with interim orders and that application to a court may be
necessary to enforce an order against a non-compliant party. Parties

321.

Id. (discussing ICC Case 1434, 1976 JDI 978).

322. Indeed, one ICC arbitral tribunal has stated that "[u]nder the ICC
rules, the Arbitrators once they have been nominated, have no discretion to add
as parties to the arbitration Claimant(s) or Defendant(s) who were not identified
as such." See Bond, ICC Experience,supra note 22, at 32 (quoting 1987 ICC case
5625). Although the opinion of one arbitral tribunal has no precedential effect on

other tribunals, commentators note that this "appears to represent the general
position and practice of the ICC Court." Id. at 33.
323.
324.

See 1 CRAIG ETAL., supra note 38, at 100.
See International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes

Rules of Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings
[hereinafter ICSID Rules], reprinted in REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, app. 7;
see also 1 CRAIG ET AL., supranote 38, at 5.
325.

ICSID Rules, supra note 324, Rule 19, 20(2).

326.
327.

Id. Rule 39(1).
See id. Rule 39(1), (3).
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may also make a request to a judicial authority for provisional relief if
the parties have consented to that procedure in their arbitration
328
agreement.
Parties are permitted to present ancillary claims as long as those
claims are within the scope of the arbitration agreement and the
jurisdiction of the ICSID. 3 2 9 However, the ICSID Rules are silent with
respect to joinder or intervention of additional parties. Efforts to
allow third parties to join or intervene in the proceedings may be
hampered by the ICSID's rules on confidentiality. These rules pernit

the arbitrators to decide who-besides the parties and their counsel,
witnesses, and experts-may attend the hearing, although the rules
also require that the arbitrators make this decision "with the consent
33 0
of the parties."
4. London Court of International Arbitration
The London Chamber of Arbitration (which changed its name in
1981 to the LCIA) was established in 1892 to provide arbitration
services in commercial disputes.3 3 1 The LCIA receives approximately
sixty to seventy new matters a year (approximately one-third of which
involves at least one non-U.K_ party), with the amount in dispute
varying from forty thousand to over one hundred million U.S.
33 2
dollars.
The current arbitration rules were adopted in 1985333 and state
that although the "parties may agree on the arbitral procedure, and
are encouraged to do so," in the absence of such an agreement the
arbitral tribunal "shall have the widest discretion allowed under such
law as may be applicable to ensure the just, expeditious, economical,
and final determination of the dispute."3 34 The breadth of this
language suggests that the LCIA might be among the few arbitral
institutions willing and able to allow joinder or intervention of third
parties without the consent of existing parties to the arbitration, at
least where it would be just, expeditious, and economical to provide a
single forum for the issues in dispute. In fact, the LCIA expressly
permits the joinder of third parties over the objection of existing

328.

See id. Rule 39(5).

329.
330.

See id. Rule 40(1).
Id. Rule 32(2).

331.
See Alan C. Geolot, Arbitration Under the Rules of the London Court of
International Arbitration, C495 ALI-ABA 161, 163 (1990) (explaining the history
and role of the court).
332. See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 5-6; Geolot, supra note 331, at
163-64.
333. See London Court of International Arbitration Arbitration Rules
[hereinafter LCIA Rules], reprintedin REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, app. 8;
Geolot, supranote 331, at 164.
334. See LCIA Rules, supranote 333, arts. 5. 1, 5.2.
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parties to the arbitration, although it requires the consent of the

party to be joined.3 3 5
Under the LCIA Rules, joinder is a type of interim relief that may
be granted by the arbitrators on the application of any party or sua
sponte, unless the parties "at any time" agree otherwise.3 3 6 Although
this final clause appears at first to emasculate any attempt to fashion
creative relief or join third parties, the arbitrators' ability to join third
parties is dependent only on (1) the consent of the third party and (2)

the absence of the existing parties' agreement to the contrary.

In

other words, if one existing party wants to allow joinder and the third
party agrees to be joined, the other party to the arbitration cannot
block the joinder.3 3 7 It is unclear whether under the LCIA Rules a
third party could intervene over the objections of all parties signatory
to the arbitration, but such a result might be consistent with the
LCIA rule on joinder.
The specificity of the LCIA rule on joinder makes it difficult to
criticize. Under normal circumstances, one way that opponents to
intervention and joinder may attack the rule is to claim that principles of
confidentiality in arbitration prohibit third parties from joining or
intervening in an arbitration. However, those hoping to avoid joinder of a
third party cannot point to the confidentiality provisions in the LCIA
Rules to win their point, even though the LCIA Rules appear to suggest,
at first glance, that a single party is allowed to bar joinder of a third
party.3 3 8 Obviously, such an outcome is impermissible in light of the
rule's explicit provision on joinder.
Because the LCIA rule on
confidentiality does not apply to situations involving joinder of a third
party, it is logical to argue that other rules and laws on confidentiality
should not be allowed to prohibit joinder or intervention of third parties
as of right.
5. The Netherlands Arbitration Institute
The Netherlands Arbitration Institute (NAI) was established in 1949
to promote arbitration as a method of dispute resolution.3 3 9 The NAI

335.

See id. art. 13.1(c); Rau & Sherman, supra note 8, at 118; Schwartz,

supranote 9, at 346 n.30.
336.
LCIA Rules, supranote 333, art. 13.1 (noting that "[u]nless the parties
at any time agree otherwise," the arbitral tribunal "shall have the power.., to...
allow other parties to be joined in the arbitration with their express consent, and
make a single final award determining all disputes between them"). Article 13
also lists other types of interim relief available to the parties from the arbitrator.
See id. art. 13.
337. See 1 CRAIG ETAL., supranote 38, at 96 n.100.
338. See LCIA Rules, supra note 333, art. 10.4 (stating that all hearings
shall be confidential unless the parties agree otherwise).
339. See Netherlands Arbitration Institute Arbitration Rules [hereinafter NAI
Rules], reprintedin REDFERN & HUNTER, supranote 5, app. 10.
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Rules were revised in 1986 to take account of certain changes in Dutch
arbitration law and, like the substantive law of The Netherlands, do not
distinguish between domestic and international arbitration. 34° However,
for international arbitrations, the NAI Rules have reversed the normal
Dutch practice of giving the arbitral tribunal the ability to act as an
amiable compositeur as a matter of law unless the parties agree
otherwise. 3 4 1 Instead, the NAI Rules allow the tribunal to acquire the
powers of an amiable compositeur only upon the agreement of the
3 42
parties.
As is the case with the rules of other arbitral institutions, the
general framework of the NAI Rules requires the arbitrators to
"ensure the equal treatment of the parties" and to "give each party an
3a
opportunity to substantiate his claims and to present his case." 4
However, within these general restrictions, the tribunal is empowered
to determine the arbitral procedure, "taking into account the
provisions of these Rules, arrangements, if any, between the parties,
and the circumstances of the arbitration."3 44 It is arguable that
under a proper fact scenario, an arbitral tribunal could decide that
"the circumstances of arbitration" required intervention by or joinder
of a third party as of right.
In addition to this broad grant of discretion in deciding the
arbitral procedure, the arbitral tribunal is empowered to grant a
party's request for interim relief at any time, at least to the extent
that such relief is "consider[ed] necessary or desirable as to the
matters in dispute."345 However, in asking the tribunal to grant
provisional relief, a party does not lose its right to apply to a court for
3 s
interim protection. 4
Although consolidation is not specifically mentioned in the body
of the NA Rules, it is addressed in the introductory section, which
notes that consolidation of arbitrations is permitted under Dutch
arbitration law, despite the silence of the NA Rules on the subject.3 4 7
However, the introduction to the NAI Rules also notes that
consolidation can be excluded by agreement of the parties at any
time.3 48
Implicit in the NAI Rules is the understanding that consolidation
is not barred per se if the different arbitrations are initiated under
different agreements. This conclusion is based on the fact that the

340.
341.

See id. Introduction, 5(e), art. 45.
See id.

342.
343.

See id.
Id. art. 23(1).

344.

Id. art. 23(2).

345.
346.
347.
348.

Id. art. 37(1).
See id. art. 37(4).
See id. Introduction, 5(d).
See id.
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Rules permit counterclaims if they "fall under the same arbitration
agreement as that on which the request for arbitration is based, or if
the same arbitration agreement is expressly or tacitly made to apply
to [the counterclaims] by the parties."3 4 9 This latter phrase also
appears to approve of methods designed to overcome problems with
35 0
privity of contract, such as the group theory or implicit consent.
However, the NAI Rules' most unique provision appears in article
41. According to that article, "[a] third party who has an interest in the
outcome of arbitral proceedings to which these Rules apply may request
the arbitral tribunal for permission to join the proceedings or to intervene

therein."3 5 1 This recognition of third parties' interests in arbitration is
particularly encouraging to those who support the right of third parties to
join and intervene in international arbitrations, especially as The
Netherlands is often at the forefront of legal innovations.3 5 2 Third parties
are not the only ones who benefit from this rule; a party to an arbitration
who has a right of indemnification from a third party may also serve a
notice ofjoinder on that third party.3 53 However, joinder or intervention
may only be permitted ff the third party "accedes to the arbitration
agreement by an agreement in writing between him and the parties to the
arbitration agreement"3 5 4 Therefore, in contrast to the LCA Rules, third
party participation may be thwarted by a single objecting party.355 Once
agreement is obtained, the third party becomes a party to the arbitration
356
and is liable for its share of costs in accordance with the NAI Rules.
6. Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 3 57 has instituted its own
Arbitration Rules (Stockholm Arbitration Rules), which are much less

349. Id. art. 25(2).
350. See supranotes 61, 318-21 and accompanying text (discussing group
theory and implicit consent in arbitrations).
351. NAI Rules, supra note 339, art. 41(1).
352. For example, The Netherlands was among the first countries to
recognize patients' right to die with dignity and to allow physician-assisted
suicide. See, e.g., Gay Alcom & Celia Hall, Cancer Patient Ends His Life at the
Push of a 'DeathMachine' Button, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 26, 1996, at 4
(noting that Australia's Terminally l Act was based on an earlier law passed by
The Netherlands).
353. See NAI Rules, supranote 339, art. 41(3).
354. Id. art.41(4).
355. See supranotes 335-38 and accompanying text (discussing third party
joinder under the LCIA Rules).
356. See NAI Rules, supranote 339, arts. 41(4), 41(6).
357. Far fewer arbitrations are filed with the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce Arbitration Institute than with older, more established administrative
institutions, which is surprising in light of Sweden's traditional popularity as an
arbitral forum. See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 5, 515-16; Craig, supra note
1, at 13-14.
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detailed than the rules of other institutional bodies. The arbitral
procedures are to be determined by the arbitral tribunal, although in so
doing, the tribunal should comply with provisions in the parties'
arbitration agreement and have regard to the parties' wishes.3 5 8 In
addition, the tribunal should act 'in an impartial, practical and speedy
fashion."3 59 This last provision seems to give arbitrators the ability to
add third parties to the arbitration if it is "practical" to do so, but the
earlier provision requiring the arbitrators to have regard for the parties'
wishes may cancel out that interpretation if there is an objection by an
existing party or parties.
7. Specialized Industry Rules
Unlike many of the larger arbitral institutions, several industryspecific arbitral bodies specifically address consolidation of claims
and seem likely to permit intervention and joinder of third parties
over the objection of existing parties. Some believe that this result
may come about because it is easier for industry-specific bodies to
anticipate the kinds of cases that will come before them and because
these bodies believe themselves to be more capable of anticipating the
potential risks of consolidation, joinder, and intervention than the
more general arbitral institutions are. 360 For example, consolidation
361
of arbitrations is permitted by the AAA Grain Arbitration Rules,
3 62
and the New York
the National Association of Securities Dealers,
3
Stock Exchange. 6
Still, industry bodies are not universally in favor of third party
participation in existing arbitrations.
Some specialty bodies
specifically forbid joinder of parties. For example, the American
Institute of Architects' General Conditions prohibit non-consensual
joinder of an architect in any arbitration between an owner and a
contractor.3 6 4 Although a detailed discussion of the procedural rules

358. See Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce [hereinafter Stockholm Rules], reprintedin REDFERN & HUNTER, supra
note 5, app. 11 art. 16.

359.
360.

Id. art. 16.
See Rau & Sherman, supranote 8, at 118.

361.

See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, GRAIN ARBITRATION RULES, Rule

7 (March 1, 1994) (describing the circumstances under which arbitrations should
be consolidated), reprintedin 5 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, IV.U.S. 1.k
(Eric E. Bergsten ed., 1997); Hoellering, supranote 9, at 48; Stipanowich, supra
note 1, at 517.
362.
See UNIFORM CODE OF ARBITRATION § 10314(d) (National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD), 1996), in NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS,
MANUAL (1996); Bompey et al., supra note 24, at 60 n.250.
363.
See New York Stock Exchange, Arbitration Rules § 600(d); Bompey et
al., supranote 24, at 60 n.250.
364.
See Thomson, supranote 94, at 139 n.4, 165 (citing AMERIcAN INSTITUTE OF
ARCHITECTS,

AIA DOCUMENT A201:

GENERAL CONDITIONS

OF THE CONTRACT FOR
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of these industry-specific institutions is not necessary, it is worth
highlighting their existence because their innovations may

subsequently gain the acceptance of the general arbitral institutions.
C. InternationalConventions on Arbitration

As has been discussed above, international arbitration
procedures, for the most part, are regulated by laws and rules passed
by various states and arbitral institutions. However, some nongovernmental organizations have also contributed to the growing
number of proposed arbitral procedures. As before, this section will
highlight only those provisions that are relevant to the discussion.
1. UNCITRAL Model Rules and Model Law
In 1976, the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law developed a set of arbitration rules known as the UNCITRAL
Model Rules to facilitate ad hoc arbitrations of international trade
disputes. 365 Although the UNCITRAL Model Rules were created to
provide ad hoc arbitrators with an established set of guidelines, the
Rules can also be used in an administered arbitration in lieu of the
institution's procedural rules.3 6 6 Because many ad hoc arbitrations
are private, it is difficult to identify how many arbitrations have used
the UNCITRAL Model Rules, but experts believe that the number is
less than the number of arbitrations proceeding in front of the
ICC.3 67
As is the case in other arbitral regimes, parties operating under
the UNCITRAL Model Rules must be treated equally and have a full
opportunity to present their case.36 s Beyond this basic principle, the
tribunal is permitted to conduct the arbitration in any way it

CONSTRUCTION

4.5.5 (14th ed. 1987)). A contractor may be joined without its consent,

however, in an arbitration between an owner and architect. See id In a survey of 387
construction arbitrators, the consensus was that the rules should be changed to join
architects in appropriate cases. See ic. at 139-40, 166-67. This suggests that some
arbitrators might support consolidation being more widely available, even outside
construction cases.
365.
See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, at 480; John D. Franchini, Note,
International Arbitration Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: A Contractual
Provision for Improvement, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2223, 2223-24, 2226 (1994);
Laturno, supra note 2, at 384.
366.
See Laturno, supranote 2, at 384.
367.
See REDFERN & HUNTER, supranote 5, at 497.
368.
See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, reprintedin id., app. 12, art. 15; see
id. at 486.
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considers appropriate. 36 790 Hearings are generally private unless the
3
parties agree otherwise.
Interim awards and relief from the arbitrator are permitted
under article 26 at the request of either party, but only when deemed
"necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute."3 7 1 Parties
may also apply to the courts for interim relief without being
considered to have violated or waived their rights under the
arbitration agreement. 37 2 In addition, arbitrators may act as
amiable compositeursor ex aequo et bono if the parties so agree and
if the applicable law so permits.,3 73
Although parties may amend or supplement a claim or defense
at virtually any time, claims may not be amended "in such a manner
that the amended claim falls outside the scope of the arbitrator
clause or separate arbitration agreement."3 7 4 This seems to prohibit
an existing party from pursuing a claim against a third party who
has not agreed, implicitly or explicitly, to participate in the
arbitration or to whom an existing party objects.
In 1985, the United Nations followed the UNCITRAL Model Rules
with the UNCITRAL Model Law on international arbitration.3 75 The
UNCITRAL Model Law, which was intended to help liberalize
international commercial litigation by minimizing the role of domestic
courts3 7 6 and by giving full effect to party autonomy, has been

adopted by a large number of countries and U.S. states.3 77 In
establishing the Model Law, the United Nations also intended to
create a core of mandatory provisions that would ensure fairness and
procedural due process, as well as facilitate the enforceability of
arbitral awards.3 7 8 States reforming their legislative approach to

international arbitration can look to the Model Law as one potential
alternative.

Under the Model Law, parties are free to determine the arbitral
procedure, although the arbitral tribunal will conduct the arbitration
as it sees fit if the parties cannot reach an agreement. 3 7 9 Whatever

369.

See id. art. 15(1).

370.
371.
372.
373.

See id. art. 25(4).
See id. arts. 26, 32; REDFERN & HUNTER, supranote 5, at 49 1.
See UNCITRAL Model Rules, supranote 368, art. 26(3).
See id. art. 33(2); REDFERN & HUNTER, supranote 5, at 37.

374.

UNCITRAL Model Rules, supranote 368, art. 20.

375.
See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, at 509; see also UNCITRAL
Model Law, reprintedin REDFERN & HUNTER, supranote 5, app. 21.
376.
See UNCITRAL Model Law, supranote 375, art. 5 (in matters governed
by this Law, no court shall intervene except where so provided in this Law."). But
see id. art. 6 (listing several functions which are to be completed pursuant to

court authority).
377.
378.
379.

Gaillard, supranote 123, at *17 n. 1.
See REDFERN & HUNTER, supranote 5, at 509.
See UNCITRAL Model Law, supranote 375, art. 19.
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the procedure, the parties are to be treated with equality and given a
full opportunity to present their case. 380 Despite the precedence
given party autonomy, the UNCITRAL Model Law does not give it
absolute priority, and parties are only able to agree on procedures
that do not contravene the public policy considerations contained in
article 18.3 81 Like the UNCITRAL Model Rules, the UNCITRAL Model

Law expressly permits arbitrators to act as amiable compositeurs or
ex aequo et bono if the parties agree to grant the arbitrators such
38 2
power.
At this point, the UNCITRAL Model Law is silent on the subject
of consolidation, intervention, and joinder.3 8 3 Article 17, however,
allows arbitrators to order interim measures of relief when "necessary
in respect of the subject-matter of the disputes."38 4 Courts may also
order interim relief, as the Model Law states that "[it is not
incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a party to request"
interim measures of relief from the courts, either before or during the
385
arbitration.
As is the case in some other arbitral systems, the UNCITRAL
Model Law states that if the continuation of the arbitration becomes
"impossible," then the tribunal shall terminate the proceedings.3 8 6
This provision might be effective in persuading recalcitrant parties to
consent to joinder of or intervention by a third party, if the
arbitrators take the position that it would be impossible to proceed
fairly without the participation of the third party.35 7 The existing
parties would then have the choice of allowing the third party to join
the arbitration or having the arbitration terminated and the dispute
litigated.
2. World Intellectual Property Organization
Because most intellectual property is protected on a national,
rather than an international, basis, international disputes regarding
infringement of intellectual property rights are quite common.3 8 8 In
1967, the United Nations established the World Intellectual Property

380.
See id. art. 18.
381.
See id. arts. 18-19; REDFERN & HUNTER, supranote 5, at 517.
382.
See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 375, art. 28(3); REDFERN &
HUNTER, supra note 5, at 37.
383.
See Gaillard, supranote 123, at *22; Hoellering, supranote 9, at 48.
384.
See UNCITRAL Model Law, supranote 375, art. 17; REDFERN & HUNTER,
supra note 5, at 517.
385.
See UNCITRAL Model Law, supranote 375, art. 9.
386.
Id. art. 32(2)(c).
387.
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (noting the impossibility of continuing with
an action in the absence of certain indispensable parties); FED. R. Civ. P. 24
(regarding intervention as of right).
388.
See Laturno, supranote 2, at 358, 362.
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Organization (WIPO), which was intended to increase the worldwide
protection of intellectual property by (1) encouraging international
treaties on the subject and (2) centralizing the administration of
those treaties. 38 9 WIPO currently administers some of the world's
most important copyright conventions.3 9 0 Because some of these
conventions do not include efficient dispute settlement procedures,
WIPO has adopted a set of arbitration rules to facilitate resolution of
intellectual property disputes, and, in 1994, began to administer
391
international arbitrations at the WIPO Arbitration Center.
However, the WIPO Arbitration Rules, which were influenced by both
the UNCITRAL Model Rules and the AAA International Arbitration
Rules, are not designed solely to resolve intellectual property
disputes, but can arguably be used in any type of commercial
3 92
arbitration.
Unlike many other arbitration rules and laws, there is no specific
statement in the WIPO Rules that the arbitrators must take into
account the procedural preferences of the parties. Instead, the WIPO
Rules state that they apply to the arbitration except to the extent that
they conflict with mandatory provisions of law, at which time the Rules
do not apply.3 9 3 The arbitrators are to "conduct the arbitration in such
matter as [they] consider appropriate," subject only to the requirement

that the parties be treated equally, that each party be given a fair
opportunity to present its case, and that the arbitration complies with
the mandatory provisions of law cited in article 3 of the Rules.3 9 4 An
arbitrator may decide as an amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono
3 95
only if the parties expressly authorize such actions.
The arbitral tribunal is expressly granted the authority to issue
any provisional orders and other sorts of interim relief it "deems
necessary, including injunctions and measures for the conservation
3 96
of the goods which form part of the subject-matter in dispute."
The parties may request judicial assistance regarding "interim

389.
See id. at 372-73.
390.
For example, WIPO administers the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 102 Stat. 2853, 828
U.N.T.S. 221, as revised July 24, 1971; the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, as revised
July 14, 1972; and the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International
Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891, 23 U.S.T. 1353, 828 U.N.T.S. 389, as
revised July 14, 1967. See Laturno, supranote 2, at 373.
39 1.
See WIPO Rules, supra note 56, at 559. WIPO has also adopted rules
of conciliation and expedited arbitration. See id. 562-66 arts. 127, 586-89 arts.
14.
392.
See Laturno, supranote 2, at 379, 382.
393.
See WIPO Rules, supra note 56, 34 I.L.M. 568 art. 3(a).
394.
34 I.L.M. 568, 571, arts. 3, 38.
395.
See id. art. 59(a), at 578.
Id. art. 46(a), at 575.
396.
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measures," security on a claim, or implementation of any of the
arbitrator's orders without such a request being deemed incompatible
with or constituting a waiver of the agreement to arbitrate. 39 7 As in
other arbitral procedures, the arbitration may be terminated if it
becomes "unnecessary or impossible" to proceed. 3 98
As confidentiality is a major concern in intellectual property
matters,3 9 9 it is not surprising that the WIPO Rules contain detailed
provisions defining confidential information and how it is to be
treated. 40 0 Unlike other procedural rules, which often focus on the
inability of the arbitrators to disclose confidential information learned
during the arbitration process, the WIPO Rules' confidentiality
provisions bind the parties as well as the arbitrators. 40 1 Hearings
are to be private unless the parties agree otherwise. 4 °2

IV.

INTERVENTION AND JOINDER OF THIRD PARTIES AS OF RIGHT: A

PRAGMATIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

Obviously most states, arbitral institutions, and nongovernmental organizations are not yet ready to recognize the right of
third parties to intervene or be joined in an arbitration over the
objection of existing parties. With a few notable exceptions, 40 3 the
most that these bodies are willing to do for third parties is to permit
consolidation of arbitrations. In many cases, even this is not possible
without the consent of all concerned.
Nevertheless, the time may be ripe to consider whether there
should be a right for third parties to intervene or be joined an
arbitration proceeding. The question is whether this right can
develop under the existing arbitration regimes-be they established
by states, arbitral institutions, or non-governmental organizationsor whether the laws and rules will need to be amended before the
right can be established. The following is an analysis of the

provisions described in Part III, identifying what arguments can be
made for and against intervention and joinder under existing laws
and rules.

397. Id. art. 46(d), at 575-76.
398. Id. art. 65(c), at 580.
399.
See Baldwin, supra note 8, at 458; Laturno, supranote 2, at 362.
400.
See WIPO Rules, supranote 56, art. 52, at 576-77.
401.
See id. arts. 73-76, at 582-83. Some commentators have argued that
confidentiality provisions that bind the arbitrators but not the parties are illusory
at best. See Collins, supranote 24, at 133.
402.
See WIPO Rules, supranote 56, art. 53(c), at 577.
403.
See, e.g., Netherlands Act, supra note 219, art. 1045(1); LCIA Rules,
supranote333, art. 13.1; NAI Rules, supranote 339, art. 41(1).

19981

INTERVENTION AND JOINDER

A. Intervention and JoinderUnder the Principleof Equality Between
the Parties
As set forth above, the vast majority of states and arbitral
institutions require arbitrators to ensure equality between the parties
during arbitral proceedings. 40 4 Most analyses of what constitutes
equality between the parties have focused on the selection of the
arbitral tribunal and concluded that it is impossible to ensure
equality of the parties during the selection process if third parties
intervene or are joined over the objection of existing parties. 40 5
However, problems involving equality of the parties and the selection

of the arbitral tribunal can easily be overcome. 40 6 Therefore, the
equality principle may be available as a possible basis for
intervention or joinder of third parties as of right.
The principle of equality of the parties arises out of two different
legal theories. First, equality of the parties in arbitration is based on the
presumption that parties would not agree to a dispute resolution
procedure that is inherently biased in favor of one party, absent
extraordinary coercion or fraud by one side.40 7 This approach recognizes
that there are certain limits to party autonomy in arbitration that are
similar to the restrictions placed on contracts of adhesion. These limits
exist even in jurisdictions that emphasize the contractual nature of
arbitration. Second, the principle of equality of the parties is based on the
premise that states require all dispute resolution procedures-even those
created by contract-to conform to certain general standards of due
process, including equality between the parties. This interpretation is
based more on concerns about public policy, which will be discussed at
length in Part IV.D, infra, than concerns related to party autonomy.
However, the autonomy argument is worth considering.
Because the principle of equality between the parties
demonstrates that party autonomy does not control all aspects of
arbitration, critics of joinder and intervention who claim that party

404.

See supra notes 132, 167, 207, 211, 220, 246, 289, 303, 343, 368,

380, 394 and accompanying text; see also Park, National Law, supra note 66, at
660-63 (noting that both courts and arbitrators have the responsibility to ensure
that minimal procedural requirements are met).
405.
See REDFERN & HUNTER, supranote 5, at 187, 292; Lecuyer-Thieffry &
Thieffry, supra note 2, at 609-10; Rau & Sherman, supra note 8, at 110 n.115

(discussing in the context of the French Dutco case the principle of equality of the
parties and whether every party in an arbitration has a right to name an
arbitrator); Schwartz, Dutco, supra note 49; Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 523
(discussing "race to arbitration" in order to have the right to name an arbitrator).
406. See supranotes 49-56 and accompanying text.
407. In Germany, creating an arbitration procedure that favors one party is
expressly disallowed. See supra note 43. In the U.S., however, differences in
bargaining power do not make mandatory arbitration agreements
unconscionable. See id.
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autonomy must take precedence over all other considerations in
arbitration are effectively silenced.
In this way, autonomy is
overcome in order to ensure that disputes between the parties are
resolved on equal terms, no matter what the parties' relative
bargaining positions were before they entered into the contract.
Once it is agreed that equality of the parties "trumps" party
autonomy, the question is whether a court or tribunal can order joinder
of or intervention by third parties in order to uphold equality of treatment
of the parties to an arbitration. The classic case of a party "in the
middle"4° 8 suggests that there may be times when a party will lose
certain claims or defenses or be subjected to inconsistent judgments and
multiple proceedings if it cannot bring certain third parties into the
arbitration. Therefore, it could very well be argued that to ensure
equality of the parties, an arbitrator or court should permit a willing third
party to be joined to the arbitration, even over the objections of one party,

to ensure that the party in the middle will not lose possible claims and
defenses or be forced to reprove the same facts in multiple proceedings.
This approach would also eliminate the possibility that the party in the
middle would be forced to settle merely because it could not afford to relitigate the same matter numerous times with no hope of a single, final
resolution. Because the possibility of piecemeal litigation puts unequal
pressures and limitations on the different participants, "equality of the
parties" might be read to allow all parties to join in a single forum to
resolve their disputes.
Opponents of joinder and intervention will claim that by letting an
outsider into the arbitration to aid one of the existing parties, the arbitral
tribunal is actually favoring that party and violating the principle of
equality between the parties. That would be true if the arbitrator created
some sort of unequal rule of participation, such as only allowing
respondents to join third parties or only allowing entry of one third party
per arbitration. However, if claimants and respondents are treated
equally with respect to the ability to join necessary third parties, then the
principle of equality between the parties has been respected.
This argument is admittedly novel in that equality of the parties
is measured not just by how the parties are treated in the immediate
arbitration (including the potential loss of claims and defenses), but
also by how external forces (including the cost of subsequent
litigations, the possibility of inconsistent results, etc.) affect the
relative position of the parties.40 9 Nevertheless, just because the

408. A party might find itself "in the middle" if it has contracts with two
different parties, only one of which is a party to the arbitration, and both
contracts are implicated with respect to the single dispute in arbitration. See,
e.g., 1 CRAIG ETAL., supranote 38, at 102-03.
409. The argument is not as far-fetched as it initially seems, however,
especially when one considers that "[aln arbitrator's view of disputes is much
broader than a judge's because an arbitrator is more likely to assess the entire
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argument is novel does not mean it should be disregarded. Even if
the argument is not strong enough to stand on its own, it still may be
used to bolster other arguments in favor ofjoinder.
The classic "party in the middle" is not the only time that issues
of third party participation arise in arbitration. Sometimes a third
party will want to intervene, even over the objections of both parties,
because it fears that its rights and interests will be negatively affected
if the arbitration proceeds in its absence. The question, therefore, is
whether the principle of equality between the parties can be extended
to protect third parties who wish to intervene in the arbitration.
"Equality of parties" can be interpreted in one of two ways,
requiring either equality of the parties to the arbitration or equality of
the parties to the contract. The more narrow view of the equality
principle requires arbitrators to look only at the relative position of
the parties to the arbitration, with no consideration of whether there
are other signatories to the contract containing the arbitration
agreement. However, an argument may be made that, because (1)
arbitration is contractually based and (2) the arbitral parties'
relationship is created and defined by the contract, "equality of the
parties" should be read to include all parties to the contract, not just
those who are participating in the arbitration. Where there are
multiple parties to a contract and not all are involved in the
arbitration, a broad interpretation of "equality of the parties" requires
any signatories to the contract who are not participating in the
arbitration to be allowed to intervene to protect their rights with
respect to the other parties to the contract. Of course, the intervenor
would have to possess some interest in or connection with the
4 10
subject matter of the arbitration.

Finally, there will be times when third parties wish to intervene in
an arbitration even though they are not signatories to the contract at
issue 4 11 or, indeed, of any relevant contract. Under both a broad and a
narrow interpretation of "equality of the parties," third parties who are
strangers to both the contract and the arbitration have little ground to
claim equality with the signatories. Indeed, they are in a distinctly
different position. Therefore, an equality of the parties argument will not

relationship between the parties, rather than to confine the inquiry to the
particular claim asserted." Motomura, supra note 1, at 38. But see id. at 77-78
(noting that arbitration's efficiency stems from the exclusion of claims and parties
outside the arbitration agreement).
410. See supranotes 12-13 and accompanying text (defining intervention as

of right).
411.

If the third party is somehow linked to one of the parties to the

arbitration via a different contract than the one primarily at issue, we again must
decide whether to take a broad or narrow view of whether "equality of the parties"

must take into account external factors such as one of the parties' related
contracts. See supranote 409 and accompanying text.
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provide a non-signatory any grounds for intervening in an arbitration
over the objections of the existing parties to the arbitration.
B. Intervention and JoinderUnder the Principleof GrantingParties
the Full Opportunityto Present Their Cases
In addition to requiring that arbitrators respect the equality of the
parties, many states and arbitral institutions also demand that
arbitrators ensure that all parties to the arbitration are given a full
opportunity to present their case during the proceeding.41 2 .This
requirement is based on one of three grounds. First, the right to a full
opportunity to present one's case presumes that parties could not and
would not contract for a dispute resolution proceeding that intentionally
curtailed their ability to present their claims and defenses. Second, the
requirement that all parties have a full opportunity to present their case
relies on the possibility that unless all relevant entities are made party to
4 13
a single proceeding, some parties may lose certain claims or defenses.
Although this concept is not often discussed in the context of
intervention, it is mentioned in connection with joinder and
consolidation. Third, the requirement that the parties be given the full
opportunity to present their case is based on a public policy argument
that states will not allow parties to contract around certain fundamental
due process protections.4 14 The first two arguments will be discussed
here, while the public policy issues will be dealt with in Part IV.D, infra.
Parties to an arbitration have a good argument for joining
consenting third parties to the arbitration if they can demonstrate their
inability to present their fll claims or, more likely, their full defenses
without those third parties. This argument does not rely solely on the
desire to prevent inconsistent judgments that may result when all the

parties are not brought before a single trier of fact; instead, the power of
the argument is that one of the original parties to the arbitration may not
be able to make its offensive or defensive case without joining a third
party to the arbitration.
For example, a dispute may arise between an owner and a
contractor. Arbitration is initiated and the contractor wants to join
the subcontractor over the owner's objection.
Without the
subcontractor as a party, the contractor may not be able to effectively

412.

See supra notes 132, 167, 207, 211, 220, 246, 289, 303, 343, 368,

380, 394 and accompanying text.
413.
Some commentators describe this as the "empty chair" syndrome. See
Thomson, supranote 92, at 166.
414.
See Park, National Law, supra note 66, at 660-63 (noting that both
courts and arbitrators have the responsibility to ensure that minimal procedural
requirements are met).
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assert certain defenses. 4 15 In addition, if the subcontractor is not
joined and the contractor loses the arbitration because of an act or
omission for which the subcontractor is ultimately responsible, the
contractor may not be able to recover those damages from the
subcontractor at a later date.
The unavailability of recovery sometimes has nothing to do with
the possibility that a second trier of fact may view the situation
differently than the arbitrator (a risk that some opponents to joinder
and intervention argue is foreseeable and thus not remediable by an
arbitrator). It can result from extrinsic forces as well. For example,
the subcontractor could go bankrupt between the time of the first
arbitration and the resolution of later proceedings between the
contractor and subcontractor. There is no reason why the contractor
should have to bear the brunt of the financial loss just because the
subcontractor could not be joined to the first proceeding by virtue of
a procedural technicality. The inequity of this result increases in
jurisdictions where courts routinely stay or dismiss litigation (such
as that between a contractor and a subcontractor) pending the
outcome of the first arbitration, because there is a possibility that the
litigation will be moot as a result of the arbitration.
Once the issue of whether a party to the arbitration can bring in
a willing third party is decided, the question becomes whether
outsiders to the arbitration can rely on "full opportunity" language to
intervene in an arbitration where their participation does not affect
an existing party's ability to present its case. As discussed in the
previous section on equality of the parties, there is a broad view and
a narrow view of the interpretation of what constitutes a "party."
Under a broad view, signatories to the contract who are not parties to

the arbitration should be allowed to intervene as of right if they need
to preserve their opportunity to fully present their case regarding the
subject-matter of the dispute. Under a narrow view, signatories to
the contract who are not parties to the arbitration have no more
rights than non-signatories to the contract.
However, the question of whether non-signatories to the contract
should be allowed to intervene in an ongoing arbitration under a "full
opportunity" argument is slightly more complex than under an

415. Some critics may claim that the subcontractor could be called as a
voluntary witness in the contractor's case, but this may not always be possible.

The subcontractor may be willing to attend an arbitration where its rights are
being finally determined as a joined party but may not be willing to take the time
or risk to participate as a mere witness, since it will then have to go through the

same process if and when it is sued by the contractor. Because third parties
cannot be compelled to act as witnesses or provide documents in an arbitration,
any discovery or taldng of evidence must be voluntary. Indeed, joining a third

party may be the only way to obtain access to certain documents in that entity's
possession, since there is usually at least a limited right of discovery of parties to

an arbitration.
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"equality of the parties" analysis. "Equality of the parties" focuses on
the relationship between the parties and the need to guarantee parity
among similarly situated entities. The principle of a full opportunity
to present one's case recognizes that arbitration should not be
allowed to be binding if one's right to present one's case is curtailed.
However, states' concerns about an entity's ability to make its
offensive or defensive case should not be limited to the parties to an
arbitration or contract; all entities should be guaranteed the right to
make their full case, and if an arbitration affects a third party's right
or interest-either directly or in a significant though indirect
manner 4 16 -- then that third party should be allowed the opportunity
to protect itself, even if it is not a party to the arbitration or contract.
The third party may choose not to do so, but it should not be
precluded as a matter of law from taking this opportunity.
The ability to protect one's rights "piecemeal" is not necessarily a
sufficient method of guaranteeing a "full opportunity to present one's
case." One problem involves obtaining evidence (both documentary
and testamentary) from third parties. If the dispute is resolved
through a series of arbitrations, one or more parties may experience
difficulties in marshalling evidence for their case from third party
sources. 4 17 Another problem concerns costs. In many cases, the
price tag associated with multiple proceedings will be at least double
what it would be if the issue were resolved in a single arbitration.
This elevated expense could prevent a party with limited financial
resources from fully protecting its rights.
C. Intervention and Joinderas an EquitablePrinciple

Both courts and arbitrators have certain equitable powers in an
arbitral proceeding, although the scope of those powers varies in
different jurisdictions. 4 18
Indeed, many states' and arbitral

416. See supra notes 12-13, 86 and accompanying text.
417. This problem is due to the fact that evidence adduced in one
arbitration is not always available in another proceeding, since there are often
confidentiality orders restricting what use can be made of testimony and
documents arising out of an arbitration. See also supra note 415 (noting the
difficulty of obtaining evidence from third parties to the arbitration).
418. See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 416 (noting that an arbitrator's
power to grant interim relief is independent of the power of the court to do the
same); Higgins, supra note 11, at 1544; Michael F. Hoellering, Interim Relief in
InternationalArbitration,in ARBITRATION AND THE LICENSING PROCESS, supranote 20,

at 3-55 to 3-56 [hereinafter Hoellering, Interim Reliej]; Park, National Law, supra
note 66, at 660-63 (noting that both courts and arbitrators have the responsibility
to ensure that minimal procedural requirements are met).
For example, French courts allow arbitrators to act as amiable compositeursor
rule ex aequo et bono only if the contract so permits. See Higgins, supranote 11,
at 1543-45; see also French Code, supra note 183, art. 1497. French arbitrators
must therefore rely on the parties to grant them equitable powers, in contrast
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institutions' procedural rules grant arbitrators equitable powers,

either permitting or requiring arbitrators 4 19 to decide issues in
accordance with equitable principles, act as amiable compositeurs,
or rule ex aequo et bono.42 0 In addition, contract language may
permit arbitrators to consider principles of equity or grant arbitrators
the ability to act as amiable compositeurs or to decide ex aequo et
42 1
bono.
The way in which equitable principles can be used td permit joinder
and intervention of third parties is straightforward. Where adding an
additional party places a minimal burden on the original parties 42 2 and
the risk or cost to an existing or third party of not permitting joinder or

with U.S. arbitrators, who have certain inherent equitable powers. See Higgins,
supranote 11, at 1544; Milligan-Whyte & Veed, supra note 8, at 133. U.S. courts
also have certain inherent equitable capabilities. Although these powers are not
limitless, they could be utilized to give effect to the policies and purposes of
arbitration, namely economy and finality of the resolution of disputes. See
Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 512. Under English law, parties have traditionally
been unable to allow arbitrators to decide issues "in fairness and equity" and not
in accordance with legal provisions. See Craig, supranote 1, at 29 n. 151; see also
Michael R.E. Kerr, "Equity" Arbitration in England, 2 Am. REV. INT'L L. 377 (1991)
(advocating full recognition of equity clauses in the English courts). However, the
Arbitration Act 1996 may have altered this approach somewhat. See supra note

164.
419.
Some governing bodies grant arbitrators equitable powers as a default
mechanism by using language such as "unless the parties agree otherwise." At
other times, arbitrators' equitable powers are unwaivable, as when the law or
arbitration rule states that arbitrators shall have certain equitable powers or shall
decide according to the law and principles of equity.
420.
See supra notes 134, 149, 164, 184, 212, 221, 249, 292, 304 and
accompanying text. Interestingly, most laws and rules discussing arbitrators'
power to act as amiable compositeurs or ex aequo et bono are found in sections
referring to the substantive law of the arbitration. Therefore, some might argue
that an arbitrator's equitable powers, including the power to act as an amiable
compositeuror ex aequo et bono, only extend to principles of substantive law and
not to procedural matters such as joinder or intervention. But see 2 CRAIG ET AL.,
supranote 6, addendum 1 to app. V at 74 (including a summary and extract from
Pesquerias Espanolas de Barcaloa S.A. v. Alsthom Atlantique S.A., in which the
Chambre des Recourse of the Tribunal Cantonal du Canton de Vaud (Switzerland)
held that an amiable compositeur was "bound only by those mandatory rules of
procedure which were set up by the Swiss Concordat on Arbitration"). However, it
could also be said that, in many cases, joinder and intervention become
substantive issues by virtue of their closing off certain claims or defenses.
421.
See Motomura, supra note 1, at 43. Reinsurance contracts often give
arbitrators the power to act ex aequo et bono. See Milligan-Whyte & Veed, supra
note 8, at 131. However, powers to decide ex aequo et bono are seldom conferred
in other circumstances, see REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, at 38, although
arbitrators are more often given other equitable powers, see id. at 121-22.
422.
Notably, even what may initially appear to be a substantial burden can
be lessened significantly through routine measures such as bifurcating the
hearing or requiring the third party to bear the costs of hearing the additional
claims.
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intervention is high, the arbitral tribunal should strongly consider letting
the third party into the action.
As is the case in other equitable determinations, courts or
arbitrators must balance the equities for and against third party
participation. Equitable factors in favor of prohibiting joinder or
intervention include: (1) increased cost; (2) increased delay; (3)
disclosure of confidential matters; and (4) the existence of express
contractual provisions precluding third party participation.
Equitable factors in favor of permitting joinder or intervention
include: (1) common issues of law or fact; (2) claims arising out of
the same transaction or series of transactions; (3) significant or
irreparable harm to an existing or third party if joinder or
intervention is refused;4 23 (4) the existence of a contractual link
between an existing party and the third party; and (5) recognition of
third party rights or interests (such as a third party beneficiary
clause) in the original parties' contract. 42 4 The arbitrator should also
take into account traditional concerns about the efficiency of
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism, the cost (in money,
time, judicial resources, etc.) of having multiple hearings, the
opportunity for any party (including a third party) to present its full
case if third party participation is denied, the ability to give full relief
to any party (including a third party) if third party participation is
denied, and the likelihood of inconsistent awards. Finally, although
the arbitral tribunal should not give absolute primacy to party
autonomy, it also should not forget that arbitration is primarily a
contractual remedy.

Obviously, there is no precise formula for balancing the equities in
cases involving requests for third parties to intervene or be joined in an
arbitration. Different.jurisdictions and arbitral institutions will give
different weight to different elements, and some will be hostile to the idea
of introducing equitable considerations into what is considered a strictly
contractual matter. Others may be inclined to go too far in the other
direction and equate intervention and joinder in international arbitration
with intervention and joinder in domestic civil litigation. The solution,
therefore, is to avoid both extremes and steer a middle path, balancing
both law and equity. This approach is appropriate, as arbitration has
long been cited as a method of dispute resolution that is intended to
avoid strict legalism and introduce more equitable, commonsense
425
remedies into business disputes.

See supranotes 12-14.
423.
424. Contractual silence on the issue of third party rights can weigh either
for or against third party involvement, although it seems as if it should favor third
party participation rather than third party exclusion. See supra note 33 and

accompanying text.
425. See Bompey et al., supra note 24, at 28; Craig, supra note 1, at 18;
Rau & Sherman, supra note 8, at 91 n.7.
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D. Intervention and Joinderas a Public Policy Issue

International arbitrations raise issues not only of domestic
public policy, but international public policy as well. 4 2 6 As noted
above, many states and arbitral institutions will limit arbitral
policy and often will
procedures or awards that contravene public
42 7
overturn or refuse to enforce such awards.
There are a number of public policy concerns that arise at the
domestic level, with due process taking a position of primary
importance. "Due process," in this context, means ensuring that the
parties to the arbitration (or all parties to the contract, or all
interested parties, depending on how "parties" are defined within the
jurisdiction) are being treated properly and in accordance with the
state's mandatory provisions of law. Subsumed within due process
are the principles of equality of the parties and the opportunity for
each party to fully present its case.
States and arbitral institutions usually comply with fundamental
due process norms in international arbitration because by so doing they
encourage respect for the law and the sanctity of contracts within their
respective jurisdictions. Upholding due process also increases the
likelihood that the parties will voluntarily comply with whatever award is
eventually handed down. Therefore, if the state or arbitral institution
believes that respect for law, contracts, and arbitral awards will be
increased by permitting joinder and intervention of third parties, then it
will establish rules that allow courts and arbitral tribunals to take such
actions. Alternatively, if the state or arbitral institution believes that
these public policies will not be furthered by a liberal approach to joinder
and intervention in arbitrations, then it will limit courts' and arbitral
tribunals' ability to utilize due process arguments to justify third party
participation in arbitration.
Due process concerns are not the only types of public policy
concerns that affect international arbitration. Courts and arbitral
institutions also focus on public policies involving party autonomy and
the deference given to arbitration as a consensual dispute resolution
procedure, two issues that can affect whether entities choose to arbitrate
their disputes in a certain jurisdiction. However, respect for arbitration
and party autonomy does not necessarily require a state to prohibit
joinder or intervention of third parties as of right, either as a matter of
principle428 or as a method of increasing the number of arbitrations held
in the state. Indeed, there will be a number of parties who believe that

426.
427.

See REDFERN & HUNTER, supranote 5, at 293-4, 444-46.
See supra notes 134, 159-60, 185, 189, 250,

261-63

and

accompanying text.
428. As has been described above, courts often limit party autonomy to
further public policies. See Craig, supranote 1, at 29 n.151; supra notes 406-18

and accompanying text.
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third party joinder and intervention are improvements on the current
system and will seek out states that allow such practices. When deciding
whether to encourage or allowjoinder and intervention as of right, a state
needs to balance the number of parties who will avoid that forum
because they do not want to accede to such practices against the number
of parties who will come to that state because of its liberal policies on
429
intervention and joinder.
States must also decide whether and to what extent they want to
encourage the resolution of disputes in single versus multiple
procedures. In the context of civil litigation, domestic public policies
have generally favored single-hearing resolutions. 3 0° Arbitrations,
however, are not the same as civil litigations. Nevertheless, the
public policies that supported the development of joinder and
intervention in the domestic laws of civil procedure might support
43 1
similar developments in the law of international arbitration.
Typically, these policies include concerns about due process, time
and cost efficiencies, and avoidance of inconsistent judgments.
The final domestic public policy concern-which is also an
international policy concern--is the enforceability of arbitral awards. One
of the primary duties of the state and arbitral institution is to ensure that
the final award can be enforced. Some have argued that compulsory
joinder of parties or claims may result in an unenforceable award under
the New York Convention. 3 2 Critics of intervention as of right have also
used this argument, focusing on the portion of the New York Convention

that states that enforcement of an award may be refused if the award is
outside the scope of agreement or is granted pursuant to an arbitral
4 33
procedure not in accordance with the agreement of the parties.
Similar language is found in the laws and rules of many states and
arbitral institutions. 4 - 4 However, this approach fails to take notice of
language stating that an award is enforceable if it was "in accordance
with the law of the country where the arbitration took place," even if it
fails to comply with the agreement among the parties.4 s In fact, an
arbitration that did not join an indispensable party could result in an

429. See Rau & Sherman, supranote 8, at 35-37.
430. See Stipanowich, supranote 1, at 475-76.
431.
See id. at 501-02 (discussing judicial presumptions in the absence of
contractual language regarding consolidation and joinder, including the
presumption that parties' agreement to arbitrate includes the intent to pursue the
most efficient and economical means of commercial justice, which would include
consolidation and, presumably, joinder and intervention when appropriate).
432. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supranote 5, at 186-87; Higgins, supra note
But see
11, at 1534; Lecuyer-Thieffry & Thieffry, supra note 2, at 593.
Stipanowich, supranote 1, at 513-14.
433. See New York Convention, supranote 5, art. V(1)(c)-(d).
434. See supra notes 153, 155, 175-76, 216, 255-56 and accompanying
text.
435. See New York Convention, supranote 5, art. V(1)(d).
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unenforceable award if conducted or enforced in a country where
absolute prohibitions on joinder or intervention are contrary to public
policy.4 36 In addition, problems with enforceability under the New York
Convention are not insurmountable, as an award that permits joinder or
intervention of a third party may still be enforceable under another
international treaty or the domestic law of the place where enforcement is
to take place.4 37
Although enforcement of international arbitral awards is obviously
one type of international public policy concern, there are others, many of
which parallel domestic policy concerns. For example, international
arbitration policy is cognizant of claims regarding party autonomy and
the sanctity of contract, as well as arguments for efficiency, savings of
time and costs, and avoidance of inconsistent results. To a large extent,
though, international public policy is much less developed than domestic
public policy. Therefore international policy has more room to grow,
meaning that arguments in favor of joinder and intervention may be
more likely to occur within the framework of international, rather than
domestic, public policy. Similarly, the absence of national or partisan
ties may mean that international public policy can take a more global
perspective about whether it is fair and desirable to subject parties to
piecemeal litigation around the world, rather than to permit third party

joinder and intervention in appropriate circumstances.
E. Intervention and Joinderas a Form of Interim Relief By the
Courts or Arbitral Tribunal
Many states and arbitral institutions grant either the courts, the
arbitral tribunals, or both, the power to enter various types of interim
relief.4A3 8 As a practical matter, requests for joinder or intervention of
third parties will most likely be made in the form of a request for
interim or provisional relief.4A9 The question, of course, is whether
and to what extent applications for that sort of relief would be
allowed. 440
In most cases, interim relief is granted to preserve or otherwise
respect the rights of the parties.4 4 1 Several factors enter into the
decision on whether interim relief is necessary or permissible: (1) the

See id. art. V(2)(b).
436.
See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supranote 38, at 255.
437.
See supra notes 136, 151-52, 173, 192, 203-06, 215, 222, 239-40,
438.
247, 290-91, 306-07, 326, 334-45, 371, 384 and accompanying text.
439. Because courts and tribunals have begun to classify consolidation as a
type of interim relief, see Higgins, supranote 11, at 1524, intervention and joinder

could easily fall under the general rubric of "interim relief' as well.
440. In general, obtaining provisional relief is difficult as both a substantive
and a procedural matter. See Wagoner, supranote 257, at 68.
See Higgins, supra note 11, at 1524.
441.
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urgency of the relief requested; (2) the need to protect the status quo
between the parties during the pendency of the arbitration; (3) the
need to stop one party from increasing the gravity or duration of the
arbitration; and (4) the need to ensure the enforceability of the
arbitral award." 2 Several of these criteria could be used as a basis
for a request for intervention or joinder. For example, a party in the
middle might know that a third party indemnifactor was on the brink
of disposing of all of its assets and might need to join that third party
immediately to protect its right to indemnification.
Provisions
permitting interim relief may be found in national law, the rules of
the administering institution, or the language of the contract.
However, authority for interim relief cannot be based solely on the
need to enforce the award, since the primary enforcement
mechanism, the New York Convention, makes no express provision
443
for interim remedies in aid of arbitration.
Although some people believe that resort to domestic courts for
provisional aid violates the arbitration agreement, others disagree,
claiming that courts at the arbitral seat as well as at the enforcement site
have certain powers over an arbitration.4 " Certainly, the more common
position is that courts and arbitral tribunals both have authority to grant
interim relief, including, potentially, the ability to order intervention and
joinder of third parties. 445 This means that interim or provisional

442.

See id. at 1524, 1544-45; Wagoner, supranote 257, at 71.

443.
See Baldwin, supranote 8, at 461; Higgins, supra note 11, at 1527. In
fact, some argue that granting interim judicial relief may violate the New York
Convention's requirement that all matters be referred to arbitration. See Baldwin,
supra note 8, at 461-62 (noting a split in U.S. courts but recognizing almost
universal acceptance by non-U.S. courts that the New York Convention does not
prohibit interim relief being ordered prior to arbitration); see also DELAUME, supra
note 8, at 329 (noting that most European courts hold that interim measures of
judicial relief are not incompatible with arbitration); Wagoner, supra note 257, at
71 (quoting a recent case from the English House of Lords that noted the split in
U.S. case law and the absence of authority from other jurisdictions suggesting
that interim relief was inappropriate under the New York Convention).
444.
See Craig, supra note 1, at 50 (claiming that, as a practical matter, it is
"unrealistic" to expect that interim measures can or should only be taken by
courts at the arbitral seat); D. Alan Redfern, Arbitration and the Courts: Interim
Measures of Protection-Is the Yide About to Turn:, 30 TEx. INT'L L.J. 71, 82-86
(1995) (discussing the possibility of turning to courts for interim relief where there
is no arbitral tribunal or the tribunal has no appropriate powers); see also Park,
NationalLaw, supranote 66, passim.
445.
See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, at 307-08 (noting that
arbitrators and courts share power to order some types of interim relief, but
arguing that only courts have power over third parties); Higgins, supranote 11, at
1525 (noting "no clearcut line of demarcation delimiting jurisdictional authority
over interim measures as between the domestic court or the arbitral tribunal");
see also Baldwin, supra note 8, at 460 n.40 (noting that although arbitral
tribunals may order interim relief, such relief may be delayed while the tribunals
are being impanelled); Craig, supra note 1, at 48 (noting two points of contact
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measures can be entered not only by the arbitral tribunal, but also by
courts in several different states.44 6 Some commentators have noted that
the variety of potential sources of relief suggests that some
harmonization of the law regarding interim relief is necessary if
inequitable results are to be avoided.44 7
The authority of courts and arbitral tribunals to order provisional
measures arises from different sources, which may lead to instances
where one, but not the other, is able to grant interim relief such as
joinder and intervention of third parties. Courts' power to involve
themselves in the arbitral process stems from their need to ensure that

the award will become enforceable and to uphold the public policies of
the state.448 As has been discussed above, both of these bases can be
used to allow third party participation in an arbitration. Once a court
recognizes that it has the authority to grant provisional relief, it must
identify the standard by which the decision to grant or deny the request
is to be measured. At that point, the court looks not to the lex arbitibut
to its own law of civil procedure. 4 49 Currently, there is little harmony
45 0
among various nations as to when provisional relief is appropriate.
An arbitral tribunal's ability to grant interim relief stems from its
inherent power to control the arbitral proceedings and from the
authority granted to it by the contract. 45 ' In addition, the arbitrator
is often considered the one who must ensure that justice between the
parties is done. 452 Although both of these rationales can certainly be
used to permit third party participation, they can also be interpreted
in a much more restrictive manner. For example, opportunities for
joinder and intervention will be very limited in a system that holds
that arbitrators' power comes only from the contract. In most cases,
such an arbitral system will consider allowing third parties into the

between the courts and the arbitration: "judicial supervision of the arbitral
process" and "judicial assistanceto the arbitral process itself').
446. Some states, however, decline to exercise jurisdiction over foreign
arbitrations. See, e.g., supranote 237 and accompanying text.
447. See Craig, supra note 1, at 50, 54, 58 (noting a wide variance with
respect to interim measures allowed under national laws).
448. See id. at 50; Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 512. Courts often find the
legal authority to intervene in arbitrations in their nation's arbitration laws, in
provisions authorizing the courts to act in situations requiring immediate, shortterm relief, or arising out of certain residual powers of the judiciary. See 1 CRAIG
ETAL., supranote 38, at 423.

449.

See Craig, supra note 1, at 50; Wagoner, supra note 257, at 69

(claiming that lex arbiti addresses whether a court has the power to issue interim
relief).
450. See Craig, supranote 1, at 50.
451. See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 416 (noting that an arbitrator's
power to grant interim relief is independent of the power of the court to do the
same); Wagoner, supranote 257, at 3-56.
452. See Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 509.
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45 3
arbitration to exceed the arbitrators' explicit grant of authority.
However, an arbitral system that places a high value on the need for
the arbitrator to control the proceedings may be more likely to give
arbitrators broader discretion in this area.
When both courts and arbitral tribunals have the ability to grant
interim relief, parties usually resort to the courts prior to the
convening of the arbitral tribunal. 4 s4 Once the tribunal has been
established, requests for provisional relief are typically referred to the
tribunal first, although the parties may apply to a court to confirm or
45S
enforce the tribunal's order.

F. Intervention and Joinder Under an Impossibility Argument
In some states and administered arbitrations, an arbitrator can
45 6
terminate the proceedings if it becomes "impossible" to continue.
This provides a possible solution to the joinder-intervention problem
for those people who do not believe that considerations regarding
equity or public policy justify overcoming arbitration's contractual
basis.
Essentially, the argument is that in certain cases the absence of
a third party makes it impossible for the arbitrator to continue with
the proceedings. Because the arbitrator has an obligation to conduct
the hearings in a way that ensures equality among the parties and a
fair opportunity for each party to present its case, the arbitrator can
refuse to continue the proceedings unless those third parties are
present. By threatening to terminate the proceedings-and thereby
forcing the parties to litigate the dispute-the arbitrator can exert
considerable pressure on the original parties to waive their objections
to third party involvement.
This approach respects the dignity of the arbitral contract in
both word and deed while still taking into account third parties'
legitimate interests in the arbitration. The parties are not forced to
undergo an arbitration that they did not contemplate, but are
permitted to choose whether they wish to arbitrate the matter in the
circumstances which now present themselves (i.e., with a third party)
or whether they wish to litigate.
This may be an excellent
compromise between considerations of law and equity in arbitration.

453. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 5, at 6; Slate, supra note 6, at 60;
Wagoner, supra note 257, at 69. This is due to the fact that an arbitrator has
fewer options than a court. See Milligan-Whyte & Veed, supra note 8, at 147;
Slate, supranote 6, at 61.

454.
455.
456.

See Wagoner, supranote 257, at 69.
See id.
See supranotes 137, 154, 217, 294, 398 and accompanying text.
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G. Intervention and JoinderUnder Pure Contract Theory

1. Implied Consent
Courts and arbitrators also respect the parties' contractual
positions under a theory of joinder or intervention that relies on
implied consent.457 Under this approach, the arbitral tribunal looks
at the circumstances of each case and decides whether the parties to
the original arbitration agreement impliedly consented to
participation of third parties, not only in general, but with respect to
the particular third party who is to intervene or be joined. A narrow
view of implied consent would limit third party participation to those
who had signed some sort of arbitration agreement with one or both
of the parties. A broad view would permit non-signatory third parties
to be brought into the arbitration as well.
In looking for implied consent, courts and arbitrators should
analyze the interrelatedness of the parties and transactions at issue, the
existence or absence of any contractual link between the parties, and the
breadth of the arbitration agreement itself. For example, a very broad
agreement covering "any and all disputes" arising out of a contract will be
more likely to lead to a finding of implied consent than a very narrow
agreement covering only one specific type of dispute. Although those
who demand strict compliance with the terms of the contract would
obviously be most pleased with an approach that relied solely on the
existence of a signed arbitration agreement between every party and
potential party to an arbitration, the theory of implied consent extends
the right to join or intervene only to those third parties whom the original
parties to the arbitration presumably intended to be able to participate.
Because the original parties are deemed to have contemplated the
potential inclusion of a third party, use of the implied consent doctrine
upholds party autonomy to a high degree.
2. Group Theory
The other type of strict contractual approach to joinder and

intervention relies on the group of companies theory that has
developed in the context of consolidation of arbitrations. 45 8 Under
this argument, third parties should be allowed to join or intervene in
an arbitration if they belong to a group of companies, at least one of
whom signed an arbitration agreement that was intended to bind its

457.
This theory has been used in consolidation cases. See supra note 317
and accompanying text.
458.
See supranotes 319-22 and accompanying text.
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sister, parent, or subsidiary companies. In deciding whether to apply
the group theory, courts and arbitrators should look at the express
contractual language as well as the intent and behavior of the parties
to see if there was an intent to create an "integrated contractual
relationship subject to one single arbitration."45 9 Again, those who
demand strict compliance with the terms of the contract would prefer
to uphold contracts on their face and not introduce measures
intended to mitigate the harsh effect of such strict construction.

However, the group theory, like implied consent, is no more novel or
objectionable in the context of joinder and intervention than it is in
the context of consolidation.
H. Intervention and JoinderUnder Confidentiality Provisions
Some opponents to joinder and intervention argue that allowing
third parties into the arbitral procedure infringes on the parties'
confidentiality.4 6 0 Certainly, a number of commentators and arbitral
institutions such as WIPO are highly concerned with the
confidentiality of the arbitral procedure. 4 6 1 However, as has been
discussed above, third parties who wish to join or intervene in an
4 62
arbitration are already in possession of many of the relevant facts.
To the extent that confidentiality continues to be an issue, the
arbitrator can require the new party to sign a confidentiality order or
bifurcate the hearings and distribution of discovered documents. In
actuality, the confidentiality issue is less of a problem than is
commonly perceived. Not only do parties leak information to the
media despite their alleged concern for privacy, but the types of third
parties that would wish to and would have a right to join or intervene
in an arbitral proceeding usually are not the types of parties that
would cause confidentiality concerns. In addition, as suggested by
the LCIA Rules, the mere existence of provisions on confidentiality
463
does not necessarily preclude third party participation.

V. CONCLUSION

Obviously, not every third party should be allowed entry into an
existing arbitration. However, chanting "party autonomy" like some

sort of mantra does little to advance the discussion regarding
whether and to what extent third parties have an arguable right to

459. See 1 CRAIG ET AL., supra note 38, at 99-100 (discussing ICC Case
1434, 1976 JDI 978).
460. See supranotes 73-79 and accompanying text.
461. See, e.g., supranotes 74-80, 401 and accompanying text.
462. See supranotes 73-79 and accompanying text.
463. See supranote 358 and accompanying text.
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participate in an arbitration, since courts have long recognized that
arbitration's respect for party autonomy does not mean that every
agreement is or should be upheld as written. 4 64 As in many areas of
the law, it is necessary to balance the parties' desires against the
requirements of law and equity. In fact, a balancing approach is
particularly appropriate in arbitrations, which are often supposed to
avoid the imposition of harsh legal rules.465
Certain commentators, eager to uphold the contractual aspect of
arbitration, argue that consent to joinder and intervention can be
obtained during contract negotiations and that this is the most
466
appropriate way to deal with the problems of multi-party disputes.
However, this tactic ignores the reality of the negotiation costs that
accompany such an approach 46 7 as well as the probability that parties
will be unable or unwilling to create arbitration clauses that protect the
rights of third parties, some of whom will be unknown at the time the
transaction is completed. Although proponents of pure contract theory
may applaud this result, it is at odds with modem notions of procedural
fairness and equity, especially when bifurcating disputes based on the
mere existence of an arbitration. clause can injure legitimate rights and
interests.
In the last twenty to thirty years, international arbitrations have
become more important as the globalization of business and finance has
increased the number of transnational contracts exponentially. However,
because there is no single body regulating international arbitrations,
each state and arbitral institution must create procedures that not only
suit its own individual needs but that take into account the unique
circumstances of modem transnational law and practice. Creating
narrow interpretations of arbitration agreements that limit the ability of
third parties to join or intervene as of right may uphold party autonomy
but may not be wise as a matter of equity or sound business practice.
This Article has attempted to identify how courts and arbitral
tribunals can justify intervention and joinder of third parties under
existing rules of procedure. It may be that these arguments are
ultimately unpersuasive. Nevertheless, it is important to begin to
focus on whether and to what extent third parties should be allowed
to participate in international arbitrations, since traditional notions

464.

See

REDFERN & HUNTER,

supra note 5, at 289 (noting that parties'

freedom to dictate arbitral procedure is not totally unrestricted).
465. See Park, National Law, supra note 66, at 661-62 (noting that
arbitration seeks fairness in the sense of "equite" in continental systems);
Stipanowich, supranote 1, at 505. But see Park, NationalLaw, supranote 66, at
663 (arguing that decisions based solely on principles of "fairness" or "equite"
may appear arbitrary and may violate the principle of nullepoenasine lege).
466. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supranote 5, at 187.
467. See Rau & Sherman, supranote 8, at 116 n.141 (discussing the Coase
theorem in the context of arbitration).
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of what an arbitration should be-based as they are on the classic
two-party paradigm--are quickly being undermined by the realities of
global multi-party transactions. As this problem will only increase in
the coming years, the international legal community, including
courts and commentators, practitioners and politicians, should try to
identify a fair and workable approach to the issue of third party
joinder and intervention in arbitral proceedings.

